Two years of Rajapaksa rule shows a shift in the nation’s contextual and conceptual approach, not only in handling the war with the LTTE, but also on issues relating to political morality, governance (including accountability and rule of law), ethnic amity (not co-existence as his vision says), and fundamental rights of citizens. Instead of using the CFA the peace process as means to end the war, the President has used their aberrations as an excuse to use the military as the means to ‘end’ the conflict.
Mahinda’s vision for the country: CHANGE Sri Lanka to be a Modern State whilst Fostering the National Heritage and Culture with Peaceful Co-existence among the Communities of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and others, instilling Economic Growth and Prosperity; and Maintaining Friendly Relationship with all Nations.
Clever, grim and sad. These three words sum up Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s two years in office this month. These three words also present a cameo of the present, the immediate future and the long term future of Sri Lanka and its people. If Mahinda’s vision quoted above was being implemented, his actions during the two years of presidency did not show it, despite some paradigm changes he has effected in the island. It is clear that he sees ‘the path to peace’ through a military prism rather than a negotiated peace process.
On the other hand, the results of his actions during the last two years show a well-planned and executed effort to achieve a few other macro goals. These include: make himself the unquestionable leader and saviour of Sinhalas, take Sri Lanka out of the morass of peace negotiations, restore military morale by giving freedom of action, take advantage of Karuna’s breakaway from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to gain control of the east, contextualise the war against the LTTE to the global war on terror, and make the opposition parties including the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) irrelevant to his strength in the long term.
In this scheme of things, two aspects of global concern (particularly India) that would have long term effect on Sri Lanka as a nation did not figure. These are: creating conditions for lasting peace, and erasing the dismal human rights record of Sri Lanka. Despite their shortcomings, his predecessor Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga and the leader of the UNP, Ranil Wickremesinghe, while in office tried to address these two important issues.
Two years of Rajapaksa rule shows a shift in the nation’s contextual and conceptual approach, not only in handling the war with the LTTE, but also on issues relating to political morality, governance (including accountability and rule of law), ethnic amity (not co-existence as his vision says), and fundamental rights of citizens. Instead of using the CFA the peace process as means to end the war, the President has used their aberrations as an excuse to use the military as the means to ‘end’ the conflict.
Qualitatively, three clear paradigms emerge from this shift. These are: political interests over riding national interests, military initiatives overtaking other considerations, and trading off human rights for political or military priorities.
As a result, the feeling of insecurity among the minorities, particularly Tamils, increased for the first time after the ceasefire came into force in 2002. The clock has been put back on the so- called ‘federal formula’ which held so much hope for peace mongers and the people weary of war. The peace vision has faded under the bright glare of an emerging military vision. It is a tragic development for the people of Sri Lanka because peace and military visions never travel together.
Political Gamesmanship
The President, a politician more than a peacemaker, had cleverly used the existing negative leverages in politics and the peace process to establish himself and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) firmly in the saddle. He has put the opposition and its leader and presidential aspirant Ranil Wickremesinghe in disarray. The UNP is now locked in a struggle to survive as a credible alternative to the ruling party.
Rajapaksa has probably halted the run on the SLFP vote banks engineered by the JVP, which has set its eyes on grabbing power. While people sniggered at Rajapaksa’s omnibus expansion of his cabinet strength to 100 plus, the President had the last laugh as the political trade offs paid. The UNP lost key members in parliament who crossed over to the President’s ranks. Smaller minority parties, stranded and listless, have joined the presidential bandwagon. To ensure everyone acted upon his script, the control was passed on to the Rajapaksa family. He appointed his brothers ? Basil and Gotabaya in key appointments. This triumvirate of Rajapaksa brothers guide government policy, administration, and security operations regardless of ministerial domains.
Rajapaksa has sent clear signals that he would not forgive or forget those who break away from his ranks or present his rule in poor light. Smear campaigns against them have become part of the political game. No one can accuse him of partiality in this respect. It did not matter whether they enjoyed a cosy relationship with him like Tiran Alles or Mangala Samaraweera. He made it costly for them to defy or embarrass him. Tiran Alles’s business is now shattered and his future looks bleak. Attempt of Mangala Samaraweera, former foreign minister, to create a viable opposition party out of Rajapaksa’s detractors has not succeeded despite all the fanfare on its arrival. Media criticism was handled with equal vehemence, regardless of international cries over curbs on media freedom.
His action have shown little concern or urgency in responding to human rights grievances. The bureaucratic handling of cases of abductions and ‘disappearances,’ mostly among Tamils and Muslims, are examples of this. NGOs, particularly of the international kind, who were critical of the government were branded as anti-national or accused as fellow travellers of the LTTE. They were probably considered inconvenient obstacles to the military ends of the President.
Some achievements
It would be incorrect to say there were no achievements in this period. The armed forces regained their morale, earlier shattered by lack of direction in the past. The LTTE’s self acquired freedom to behave as it pleased in the first three years of ceasefire has been curbed as the military was given a free hand not only to retaliate but also act proactively. This has put the LTTE on the defensive. As a result LTTE’s ability to launch suicide operations at sea and on land was largely reduced. The security forces have “won” the east. It is a moot point whether they would have planned this operation in the same fashion if Karuna had defected from the LTTE with his followers and helped them.
The President also paid special attention to build bridges with countries where the LTTE networks had been operating with impunity. Their fund collection and weapons procurement operations had been a source of strength to the LTTE to further the war effort. Sri Lanka’s sustained efforts were instrumental in getting the LTTE banned in the EU and Canada, particularly after they were annoyed with the LTTE for its suspected hand in the killing of Lakshman Kadirgamar, the foreign minister, under Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga. That had set off a series of actions in India, Canada, the US and the EU which are now making the LTTE’s overseas operations more and more difficult and risky. Intelligence cooperation between Sri Lanka and these powers has played a powerful role in crippling the LTTE’s ocean fleet of supply ships.
For the first time a Sinhala consensus of sorts, though with negative connotations, is emerging. More Sinhala masses are perhaps now veering round to the belief that military action could become the magic wand in the hands of Mahinda to end the ‘Tamil Kottiya’ regime. The peace lobby has been muted and at times muzzled. War has become a better buzz word than peace now. It is a tragic reality that is dragging the country into an endless abyss of war.
It would be incorrect to attribute the President’s achievements were due to his charisma or excellence in governance. The results have been reached through a strong-Mahinda centred orientation to goals rather than the means adopted. His cold blooded non-military strategies included political manipulations, arm twisting of media, ignoring aberrations of corruption and human rights, and offering political trade offs for support. If morality was never the strong suite of Sri Lanka politics, amorality has become the order of the day in the last two years.
Handling of international opinion
Surprisingly Rajapaksa has shown a Machiavellian understanding in handling foreign powers, which have interests in his country and the Indian Ocean region. These include the international do-gooders club of Tokyo Donors Conference (EU, Japan, Norway and the US), and more importantly India. As a result he has been able to internationally run with the hares, while hunting them at home on issues of governance – rule of law, human rights and humanitarian concerns, and lack of accountability. These intangible issues are difficult to quantify. Their audit to pinpoint areas of weakness is time consuming. And their progression in the UN is equally slow. The President understands these nuances and has managed to prevent concerted international action against Sri Lanka. While he professes to be sympathetic to the cause of human rights and cites his own record, his priorities are different. At the moment, he knows what is good internationally does not garner populist votes at home.
His actions have not brought any comfort to the Four Co-chairs and India who have been supporting him all along. They have influential human rights watchdogs which have been arm twisting their governments into action on this question. These nations have objected periodically to the lack of response from the government in Sri Lanka. However, by and large, things have continued the same way in Colombo despite some cosmetic response and commissions of enquiry. The ongoing confrontation in Sri Lanka with the LTTE who has ceased to be the darling of international community, has restricted their options. Most of their actions have been limited to discussion and complaints about human rights violations and misconduct of security forces and their paramilitary supporters and threat to cut off aid. No major actions beyond that have been taken. The President appears to have worked out a response style to exploit this attitude of external powers. He always addresses their concerns and takes some tentative action. Though this band-aid methodology is unlikely to yield lasting results, it buys him time.
While Rajapaksa has shown a calibrated readiness to discuss international concerns at the UN, he has firmly objected to the presence of a structured UN mechanism at home. He seems to have understood the way the UN and its creaking bureaucratic structure works. Amidst the cackle of rival powers, the UN takes a long, long time to translate ideas into action. On the other hand, unwittingly the UN has helped the Sri Lanka government by marginalising the need for the Four Co-chairs to raise issues already discussed at the UN. This suits the President.
International mediation
The President’s decision to carry out systematic military operations without denouncing either the ceasefire agreement (CFA) or the peace process, appears to have made the roles of Norway and the SLMM largely irrelevant in impacting the situation. As a result, the chances of reviving either the CFA enforcement or the peace process have become minimal. In any case they were rendered out of date when the security forces redrew the map of the east after grabbing areas of LTTE control. These developments appear to have divided the cohesion within the Four Co-chairs that had existed in the early years of CFA
On a five-point scale of approval for the President’s current ‘war-in-peace strategy’, Japan with five points appears to be wholly, though silently, supporting the President. On the other hand Norway as a one-pointer is at the other end, disapproving their progressive marginalisation. The EU does not appear to be clear on how far it should go on either side of the scale as its member-countries have their own national priorities at work. But the EU has a clear international counter terrorism strategy; so it precludes putting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a recognised terrorist body in many EU member countries, on par with a flawed but elected Government of Sri Lanka.
The India card
India, the reluctant big brother, has been studiously avoiding any open or close involvement in Rajapaksa style of running the country. It is still focusing on strategic aspects of peace process rather than contentious issues of tactical governance, because they are the least controversial. Currently getting involved too closely in Sri Lanka does not suit the Manmohan Singh regime because of its survival preoccupations. His desire to hold on to the continued support of Tamil Nadu political parties has precluded the Indian prime minister from acting on Sri Lanka’s request for supply of arms or overtly supporting the President’s military actions. Thus India, perhaps wittingly, has opened a convenient door for Sri Lanka to import arms from other countries including China and Pakistan.
President Rajapaksa also perhaps assesses that in the long term, if Tamil refugee outflow to India is kept in check, and India’s counsel is listened to India’s ruling leadership will continue the present policy on Sri Lanka. That includes silent defence and intelligent cooperation with Sri Lanka without publicity. India has political constraints in entering into any defence pact at present with Sri Lanka. Except for some spares and ammunition for Russian generic weapons, and the so called non-lethal defence supplies, India is not going to help Sri Lanka’s appetite for weapons. The President understands this. He also seem to know that lack of any political urgency in Tamil Nadu and the mess over building strategic ties with the US are other disincentives for any loud Indian intervention in the island at present. President Rajapaksa who initially wanted India to join the Tokyo Donors Conference has probably dropped the idea having understood India’s reluctance.
India has built strong business partnership with Sri Lanka and the trade between the two countries has been growing fast. So it will be futile to expect India to intervene in Sri Lanka in the same fashion as it did two decades ago even if the circumstances in Sri Lanka change. The Tamil leadership in Sri Lanka should understand this and contextualise their expectations.
V Prabhakaran’s ego appears to be preventing him from taking any initiative to reconstruct his relationship with the ruling Indian leadership. The LTTE continues to be banned in India. Indian security has been put on the alert against LTTE activity on Indian soil. This suits Rajapaksa as his India policy seems to be working, at least for him. He has used it to further his military agenda, at the cost of the peace process, without overtly courting adverse reaction from India.
Widening ethnic cleavages
Perhaps the biggest disservice the Rajapaksa regime has done is to fritter away the fund of good will and understanding between Sinhala and Tamil communities that had existed in the first two years of peace process. The Chandrika-Ranil combine despite their dithering over methodology, had faith in the pursuit of peace. Most of them time their public utterances were translated into action towards this objective. This was responsible for the glimmer of hope that Tamils had nourished that at last their lives would return to the peace mode.
As opposed to this, the President’s often repeated statement that while his government “remains determined to fight terrorism, we are equally committed to seeking a negotiated and sustainable solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka,” has been belied by his actions on ground. There had been a lot of foot dragging in handling the subject itself. Little has been done to revive the peace process. The war lobbies are in the forefront.
Right from the time Rajapaksa issued his manifesto, it was clear that his overwhelming desire to win over the Sinhala vote banks and emerge as the sole leader of Sinhalas overrode other priorities. His subsequent passive response to Tamil sensitivities only re-emphasised the importance of being a member of the majority community in Sri Lanka. The endless security checks, mysterious white van disappearances, and sudden appearance dead bodies in what appeared so much like Mafia killings have heightened the latent sense of insecurity among Tamils.
Undoubtedly, the callous disregard of the LTTE to observe the CFA in both letter and spirit had provided sufficient provocation for the government to act. However, on a number of issues affecting Tamils the government had shown equal callousness. The abandoning of the P-TOMS, the plan for aiding tsunami victims in north and east, is a typical example.
With the Eelam war heating up once again it is going to take a long time to regain the faith of Tamils in getting what they expect as ‘fair play’ – autonomy for the areas where they live in majority. The President’s much heralded All Party Committee (APC) to work out southern consensus on the Tamil question, like many other committee and commissions is tied in knots. It has probably been put on the backburner because of other urgent military and political priorities of the President. It is no wonder that Tamils are now feeling that their concerns are no more a national priority.
Future portends
When Rajapaksa came to power there were a lot of political loose ends: the national leadership was at a dead end and military objectives goalless and merely reactive. The government was on the defensive in dealing with the Norwegians and Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The LTTE was dictating both political and military terms. Karuna’s break up with the LTTE had created a new paradigm in the east. All these issues required policy directions and deft handling by the government to turn them to its advantage.
President Rajapaksa has used them cleverly to his military ends in freeing the Tamil areas from the LTTE control and build up his case for ‘liberating the north’ from the LTTE.
At the end of two years of office with political parties tied in knots, and India sidelined in his policy horizons, the President is probably working out strategies to take him through his term with success. That would enable him to make it easy to extend it to a second term in office.
After all said and done, the President has come out a clearly goal oriented person, though some of the goals appeared parochial. He has managed to get hold of most of the Sinhala constituency at home, impressing them with the heavy handed military option instead of pursuing a slow and tedious peace process with a recalcitrant LTTE. To handle international opinion, the President has projected Sri Lanka as another front line country in the global war on terror. This has also quietened them down.
The nation is paying a huge human and economic cost in men and material in pursuing a war that holds the promise of victory to the war lobbyists. Counterinsurgency wars without political solutions are always diminishing economic propositions, tuning productive national efforts into ephemeral gain of territory with unclear end results. Sri Lanka is no exception to this rule. Already the cost of living is hitting the roof and tourism, the main source of employment and income, is suffering. World Bank’s caution notwithstanding, the President appears to be bent on his singular pursuit of war in preference to peace.
The LTTE’s record of CFA violations, arms procurement and trafficking, killings and human rights excesses when the peace process was alive, has left it internationally high and dry. Even in countries that had lent a sympathetic ear to Tamil grievances during the last two decades, the LTTE is being shunned. In fact, these countries are involved in the process of dismantling the LTTE support network. That probably makes the President and his military lobby think that after a bloody battle or two in the north, the Tamil issue would become a historical aberration rather than a struggle of minorities for their rights.
They cannot be more mistaken. The quest for democratic rights of Tamils has continued because successive governments have dithered on the issue during the last two decades. Even the first three years of comparative peace from 2002 has not qualitatively made a difference to the Tamil grievances. Military action alone is not going to make the ordinary Tamils participate in the democratic exercise in Sri Lanka. They will continue the fight in some form or other till they are satisfied, whether the LTTE exists or not. After all, the LTTE thrives only on Tamil grievances. That is the bottom line. The President has shown a great deal of political alacrity in handling issues at home and abroad. He has to handle the Tamil issue with the same alacrity if he has to emerge as the President who makes a difference.
In any case the President is far from routing the LTTE in its home turf in the north. If the second failed attempt of the security forces to make headway in Muhamalai last week is any indication, the LTTE continues to remain strong in the north despite its losses. The security forces and the nation will be required to sacrifice more men and material before military victory of sorts comes in the near future. And that is not going to be the end of the agony of the nation and its people.
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