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Archive for October 3rd, 2007

Forces have learnt from past debacles:

Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on September 10, spelt out the Government’s position with regard to the Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.

He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.

The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the North and the East.

This means the Government is very clearly in it’s resolve in adopting a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.

But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.

Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.

But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.

Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a classic example giving credence to this school of thought.

The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive “Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi” (Do or die) compelling the Security Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE

The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles, leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass losing thousands of soldiers.

But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though they were able to effectively resist Security Forces’ moves to capture the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni.

Another school of thought is that the Government should exert pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the international front.

However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution. It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the Tiger outfit.

Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human cost involved in any such operation.

There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian population.

The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby international support though the outfit is in a weak position.

On the other hand the international community will not condone, the suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE’s war chest.

What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.

The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily. Different situation

But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.

There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990’s too the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce the battle fronts in the Wanni.

That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those parts of the East very easily.

But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to dominate the areas in the Wanni too.

The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.

Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played by the Security Forces earlier.

The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police to run the normal civil administration in the East without any hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the East to face any military operation in the Wanni.

Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.

Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around 250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics

One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction the troops were
heading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.

That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to realise its objective is only too well known.

One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects without giving clear signals about troops movement.

Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive offensive operation against the troops.

That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in their defence lines.

Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to different battle fronts.

That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the Forces.

On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security

Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the civilian population.

In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to Colombo or any other part of the country.

The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the capture of Silavathura by the troops.

The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.

The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.

That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War to Colombo.

The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter their total strength to defend their territory.

According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the Wanni.
Wanni situation

They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is the only life line left for their logistic and other support.

With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate ‘VIP’ movements.

Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore, the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme pressure of the LTTE.

The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.

Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is now ailing due to stress.

Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the experience they had to face in the Wanni.

The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to surrender to the Security Forces.

Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.

But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the Wanni.

It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture.

(www.sundayobserver.com)

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Forces have learnt from past debacles:

Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on September 10, spelt out the Government’s position with regard to the Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.

He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.

The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the North and the East.

This means the Government is very clearly in it’s resolve in adopting a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.

But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.

Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.

But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.

Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a classic example giving credence to this school of thought.

The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive “Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi” (Do or die) compelling the Security Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE

The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles, leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass losing thousands of soldiers.

But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though they were able to effectively resist Security Forces’ moves to capture the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni.

Another school of thought is that the Government should exert pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the international front.

However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution. It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the Tiger outfit.

Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human cost involved in any such operation.

There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian population.

The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby international support though the outfit is in a weak position.

On the other hand the international community will not condone, the suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE’s war chest.

What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.

The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily. Different situation

But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.

There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990’s too the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce the battle fronts in the Wanni.

That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those parts of the East very easily.

But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to dominate the areas in the Wanni too.

The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.

Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played by the Security Forces earlier.

The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police to run the normal civil administration in the East without any hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the East to face any military operation in the Wanni.

Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.

Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around 250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics

One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction the troops were he
ading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.

That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to realise its objective is only too well known.

One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects without giving clear signals about troops movement.

Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive offensive operation against the troops.

That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in their defence lines.

Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to different battle fronts.

That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the Forces.

On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security

Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the civilian population.

In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to Colombo or any other part of the country.

The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the capture of Silavathura by the troops.

The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.

The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.

That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War to Colombo.

The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter their total strength to defend their territory.

According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the Wanni.
Wanni situation

They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is the only life line left for their logistic and other support.

With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate ‘VIP’ movements.

Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore, the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme pressure of the LTTE.

The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.

Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is now ailing due to stress.

Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the experience they had to face in the Wanni.

The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to surrender to the Security Forces.

Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.

But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the Wanni.

It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture.

(www.sundayobserver.com)

Read Full Post »

Forces have learnt from past debacles:

Next target: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on September 10, spelt out the Government’s position with regard to the Wanni, without ambiguity at the ceremony held at the Naval Jetty in Trincomalee, when the nation paid tribute to the Navy men who returned to the Trincomalee port following their biggest victory in the sea.

He was very clear in his message that there will be no room for terrorism in the country and that if Wanni is the last bastion of terrorism that is obviously the next target of the Security Forces.

The Wanni operation is not the only message conveyed by him. He also indicated that the military option will be a backed up vehicle to implement the political solution that may be agreed upon at the All Party Representative Committee to solve the decades long conflict in the North and the East.

This means the Government is very clearly in it’s resolve in adopting a politico-military approach to the North East conflict. In other words the Government needs to win the battle against terrorism one hundred per cent to facilitate the implementation of a political solution.

But many are looking forward to the defeat of the LTTE militarily in the Wanni which is considered to be the Tiger stronghold where all its military, administrative and political apparatus are concentrated.

Whether the Government conveys this message or not the LTTE is aware that the Security Forces, if not for the external pressure on the Government to hold back its military operations, will definitely conquer the Wanni to liberate the people from the iron grip of the Tigers.

But there are those who also think it will be suicidal for the Security Forces to step into Wanni.They are of the thinking that the Wanni is impregnable . There are many reasons to support this idea since many attempts to penetrate the LTTE heartland had ended in failure.

Jayasikurui (Victory Assured) the longest and costliest battle fought by the Security Forces to capture a 76 Km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna Kandy A-9 highway was a classic example giving credence to this school of thought.

The LTTE reacted to this operation, launching a counter offensive “Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi” (Do or die) compelling the Security Forces to suspend the battle short of its objective of reaching only the Northern town of Mankulam, 32 Km South of Kilinochchi 18 months after the launch of the battle in May 1997.
Defeating LTTE

The subsequent attempts by the Security Forces, such as Ranagosa operation launched in 1999 to wrest control of the areas around Wanni though successful at the initial stage, later turned out to be debacles, leading to many reversals with Security Forces losing control of Kilinochchi, Paranthan and later the biggest debacle in Elephant Pass losing thousands of soldiers.

But the LTTE too suffered heavy losses during these battles though they were able to effectively resist Security Forces’ moves to capture the Wanni. With this background, many are of the view that the Security Forces should think twice before attempting to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni.

Another school of thought is that the Government should exert pressure on the LTTE to enter the path of negotiations without launching military operation to liberate Wanni. This idea is grounded on the premise that such an operation would lead to a negative fall out on the international front.

However, the Government is very clear on this score. It wants to militarily defeat the LTTE prior to implementing any political solution. It is not ready to advocate any political solution without crushing the Tiger outfit.

Another idea gaining currency is that the Security Forces should not step into the Wanni at this juncture and that they should seal off the Wanni and bottle in the LTTE thus starving it of supplies, taking into consideration that the outfit is already running low on ammunition specially artillery rounds. This school of thought is based on the human cost involved in any such operation.

There is a justified reason for this thinking given the long duration such an operation would entail leading to suffering of the civilian population.

The other risk involved, in the quest for capturing the Wanni,is the ability of the LTTE to dig in and use the time lag to lobby international support though the outfit is in a weak position.

On the other hand the international community will not condone, the suffering of the civilian population and such tactic would take a comparatively longer period to deplete the LTTE’s war chest.

What the Government should be clear about is that it is impractical to wait for longer period to defeat the LTTE in the Wanni since the latter has mastered the tactics of changing scenarios in an unimaginable time. The best example is the four-year Ceasefire offered to them.

The LTTE used this period to strengthen themselves militarily. Different situation

But the situation today is entirely different from that of the period in which Security Forces made unsuccessful efforts to capture the Wanni from the LTTE grip. The situation is more advantageous towards the Security Forces as they are now in a strong position against the LTTE having liberated the entire Eastern province from the LTTE grip.

There may be counter arguments, for instance in the mid of 1990’s too the Security Forces launched operations to capture Wanni when the East was fully under the control of the Security Forces. But the bitter truth is that the Security Forces closed many camps in the East to reinforce the battle fronts in the Wanni.

That was done without any plan to hold the area by using any other means. Troops were drawn for the Jayasikurui operation mainly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa without any deployment of Police or any other force to dominate the area. That enabled the LTTE to move into these territories without any resistance and have their establishment in those parts of the East very easily.

But under the present scenario the Defence authorities have not left any room for the LTTE to raise their head again in the East though they deploy the same battalions who fought the battles in the East to dominate the areas in the Wanni too.

The difference, this time is that when troops are drawn out from the newly liberated areas in the East, the Police and the Police Special Task Force have been given the task to dominate the area without leaving any room for the LTTE to make a come back to the East.

Therefore, the East has been completely sealed off to the LTTE in the wake of any offensive launched to capture Wanni. More than 50 Police stations that are going to be opened in the East will do the role played by the Security Forces earlier.

The defeat of the LTTE militarily in the East would help the Police to run the normal civil administration in the East without any hindrance. Therefore the Tiger outfit cannot expect any help from the East to face any military operation in the Wanni.

Another disadvantageous situation for the Tiger outfit is that they have lost all of their recruitment bases in the North and East with the East fully coming under the Security Forces control, meaning, the LTTE cannot have any reinforcement from the East unlike in the past.

Not only in the East they have lost the other major recruitment base in Jaffna as they have completely loss control over the Jaffna population that is estimated to around 400,000. So the LTTE have to solely depend on the Wanni population that is estimated to be around 250,000 to 350,000, for all their requirements.
Different Tactics

One major factor behind the defeats of the Security Forces in the Wanni was due to the military tactics adopted by them to capture Tiger territory in the Wanni. The Tiger outfit was aware from which direction the troops were heading towards the Wanni when troops were engaged in the 18 month long Jayasikurui operation.

That the military tactics adopted by then Commanders resulted in heavy sacrifices of young lives in the costly operation which failed to realise its objective is only too well known.

One big advantage presently accruing to the Security Forces is that it has good military strategists to surprise the LTTE in many aspects without giving clear signals about troops movement.

Therefore, the Security Forces have now been able to scatter the entire fighting strength of the LTTE into different locations without allowing them to muster their strength at one point and launch massive offensive operation against the troops.

That was why the LTTE publicly accepted that they are now engaged in defensive operations in the Wanni to defend their territories. They are now not in a position to risks to muster their strength at one point as they fear troops infiltrations if they leave any weak link point in their defence lines.

Earlier, the LTTE was able to reverse the military victories in the Wanni mainly due to manoeuvrability of its fighting strength estimated to be around 6,000 to different locations to scatter the troops to different battle fronts.

That was the key factor behind the success of the military tactics of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The Security Forces now with a good knowledge of these tactics are now adopting counter strategies used by the LTTE itself to scatter the Forces.

On the other hand the Defence authorities have also taken steps to lessen the additional duties on the Security Forces such as to guard threatened villages, by improving the Home Guard service to a quality service under the Civil Security Department while establishing the State owned Rakna Arakshana Lanka to deploy security personnel to guard economic nerve centres in the South.
Colombo Security

Another key factor that has to be considered is the security in the South as the Tiger outfit which is intent on destabilising the south through their terror activities targeting economic nerve centres and the civilian population.

In this aspect also the Security Forces are now in a better position as the recent operations in the East and also in the South of Mannar have restricted the avenues available with the LTTE to pose a threat to Colombo or any other part of the country.

The loss of the East was a major blow to the LTTE as they made use of the region to bring in explosives and suicide cadres to Colombo. Later they made use of Silavatura Sea Tiger base to implement their terror operations in the South but that option too is now defunct with the capture of Silavathura by the troops.

The only path available to the LTTE to bring in explosives to Colombo is through Omanthai. But, it has become an extremely difficult task with the thorough rigorous checking by the Security Forces at the two road blocks at Omanthai and Medawachchiya.

The fast restructuring of the intelligence networks in the South has also proved profitable for the Security Forces as they could break the LTTE cells in the South during the past one and half years.

That was why the Tiger outfit could not wreak havoc in Colombo by exploding bombs though the LTTE boasted of bringing the fourth Eelam War to Colombo.

The LTTE is facing its worst set back yet in the Wanni in the backdrop of their Eastern debacle. With the deployment of the Security Forces on two fronts in Jaffna and Wanni FDLs the LTTE has to scatter their total strength to defend their territory.

According to intelligence reports, the LTTE has around 6,000 fighting cadres in the Wanni to defend their territory in Jaffna and also in the Wanni.
Wanni situation

They have to depend on some 4,000 cadres to defend the Wanni FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduvai. With the major thrust on the West of Omanthai the LTTE have strengthened their presence in its defences West of Vavuniya as they must concentrate on the North Western coast since it is the only life line left for their logistic and other support.

With this severe shortage of man power the LTTE has now deployed civilians and stray dogs to guard the roads in fear of troops infiltrations to their territory and to facilitate ‘VIP’ movements.

Apart from this the LTTE has to deploy at least 1000 fully trained cadres for the Radha Brigade to provide security for LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Under these circumstances the Tiger outfit has to depend on the civilian population in the Wanni for all their requirements. Therefore, the civilian population in the Wanni are now living under extreme pressure of the LTTE.

The LTTE political leaders have now been deployed to be in charge of military activities. Even LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilselvan has not been spared in this as he has been given the task of defending the Pooneryn sector. Therefore, Thamilselvan has to remove his normal outfit and take cover inside a bunker to accomplish the task entrusted to him.

Balraj, the most senior military leader now with the LTTE is also not in good health like his 52 year old leader Velupillai Prabhakaran who is now ailing due to stress.

Therefore, according to Wanni sources Theepan is the only senior leader with the Tiger outfit and he is not a military tactician like his erstwhile colleagues. The leaders who escaped from the Eastern theatre have no recognition in Wanni and they are reportedly in shock due to the experience they had to face in the Wanni.

The low morale of the LTTE leaders has resulted in a large number of the rank of file ditching the outfit but have to confine themselves within the Wanni since they have to cross LTTE checkpoints even to surrender to the Security Forces.

Even with these reversals suffered by the LTTE capturing the Wanni will not be a cake walk to the Security Forces as the Tiger leader is ready to fight to the last man to defend his territory in desperation.

But the commitment of the Security Forces towards achieving the task even under difficult circumstances coupled with the leadership given by the three Forces commanders will ensure overcoming these obstacles if they launch any operation to liberate the civilian population in the Wanni.

It has thus become the duty of the Security Forces to liberate the innocent civilian entrapped in Wanni at this decisive juncture.

(www.sundayobserver.com)

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Sri Lankan troops claimed they have killed 45 Tamil rebels in the past week as they step up attacks ahead of monsoon rains that will make fighting harder.

Security forces have been trying to push into territory held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the past week amid intense resistance by the guerrillas, official sources said.

“As the rains set in by October, it will be difficult to use artillery and tanks,” a military official said. “Before the monsoon breaks there will be increased skirmishes along the front lines.”

Government figures show over 45 guerrillas have been killed in the past week while the military lost six troopers, as both sides intensified artillery and mortar bomb attacks across their defence lines.

Few casualties were reported by both sides in the previous week.

In the northern peninsula of Jaffna, a road side blast Thursday killed two civilians and wounded another 15 people, including two policemen, the defence ministry said, accusing the Tigers of setting off the blast.

In the island’s northwest, a Roman Catholic priest was killed when his vehicle was hit by a blast on Wednesday. The Tigers accused the military of killing the clergyman while the government blamed the rebels.

The defence ministry said the rebels had also tried to infiltrate military positions in Jaffna peninsula and to push further into the northern Wanni region, parts of which form a mini state run by the Tigers.

But defence columnist Namal Perera said security forces had stepped up operations in the past week in a bid to push back Tigers along two fronts in the north, meeting fierce rebel resistance.

The defence ministry’s latest figures show 5,415 people have been killed in total in insurgency related violence since December 2005 when a Norwegian brokered true began to unravel.

The figure consists of 1,271 security forces, 3,284 rebels and 860 civilians.

The Tigers have rejected the military’s claims but have not said how many fighters they lost during the same period. However the guerrillas say 1,924 civilians have been killed since February 2002.

There is no independent verification of the casualties.

The ethnic conflict, in which the rebels are fighting for an independent homeland for the Tamil minority on this Sinhalese majority island, has claimed tens of thousands of lives since 1972.

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Full text of the speech made by H.E. Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations in Geneva, during the debate under Item 4 on Human Rights situations that require the attention of the Human Rights Council, held at Palais des Nations, Geneva on 24th September 2007

Mr. President, thank you,

I was struck by the expressions of concern about the situation in Sri Lanka by our friends, mainly from the EU which doubtless will be followed by others. It is not the view of Sri Lanka that Sri Lankan matters are exclusively for Sri Lankans alone. There is a common humanity which transcends even those vital notions of popular and national sovereignty. So we do not rule out of court any and all expressions of concern about our situation. However, Mr. President, I must strike several cautionary notes.

Human Rights, Mr. President, are and must not be regarded as a new version of the White Man’s Burden. There is far too much naming and shaming going on and its flowing only in one direction. North to South, West to East; a handful of rich and powerful towards the rest of the impoverished. Now that is not in keeping with the spirit of universality and the Human Rights Council. We do not think that any group of countries or any country in particular has some special sensitivity, some special cultivated sensibility concerning human rights; some historic vocation, a civilising mission to defend human rights in our parts of the world. When I listen to my critics, Mr. President, neither my understanding of history, modern history, nor current history, leads me to share any view of moral asymmetry between Sri Lanka and those critics.

We in Sri Lanka are trying to re-unify our little island nation. The Sri Lankan government cares no less for its citizens than those well-intentioned critics do. We all live together in a little island, Mr. President. It’s a densely populated island and we do have to care for each other. Sri Lanka being a practising democracy, our citizens are also, and have always been enfranchised. They are also voters. Our government cares for its people as citizens, as individuals and as voters. It would be stretching the imagination to think that others would care for us more than we care for ourselves. We, Mr. President, did not spawn fascism on our soil. We did not have concentration camps on our soil, and we did not set out to conquer the world. We are only trying to defend and re-unify our country.

I heard a criticism of the Sri Lankan government’s position, and an endorsement of the critique of the IIGEP. It is a novel experiment Mr. President, in the middle of a conflict, we have invited international observers to help our Commission of Inquiry and to act as observers with an oversight capacity. There are doubtless asymmetries and misunderstandings. But we would also in the same spirit as our critics ask whether an international commission of inquiry had been appointed to find out what happened that night in Stammheim prison, when Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhoff and many others were found hanging in their cells. We Mr. President, do not believe in neutrality. We did not adopt a posture of neutrality between fascism and democracy, in order to build up our prosperity. We do not need lectures from those who did.

We shall discuss with High Commissioner Louise Arbour when she visits Sri Lanka about how national institutions can be strengthened with the cooperation of the High Commission. Whether or not to establish a field presence, is a matter for Sri Lanka. The Office of the High Commissioner, Mr. President, cannot be the new equivalent of an East-India company. That, Sri Lanka shall not subscribe to. Thank you.

(www.lankamission.org)

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Anandasanagree goes with his stubborn assertions about federalism; he claims he loves Sri Lanka and is a patriot. There is no Sinhala patriotism or Tamil patriotism; there can only be Sri Lankan patriotism. He is the leader of the Tamil (emphasised) United Liberation Front and he is talking about federalism based on racial lines! This is nothing but a sectarian attempt to disintegrate the nation and it people. Imagine the Indian model in Sri Lanka; it will create a Tamil Naadu here!! Does the majority Lankans know this? I do not think so.

Have you ever wondered why?
There is a significant political party by the name of-
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), but is there a Sinhala United Liberation Front (SULF);
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), but is there a Sri Lanka Sinhala Congress (SLSC);
Tamil National Alliance (TNA), but is there a Sinhala National Alliance (SNC);
Thamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikkal (TMVP), but is there a Sinhala-nation Peoples’ Revolutionary Lions (SPRL);
Illankai Thamil Arsu Kattchi (ITAK), but no SriLanka Sinhala State Party (SSSP)?

All these political parties are supporting racial-federalism, true to their sectarian names. All these political parties at some point clearly, illegally and violently manifested their separatist aspirations as well.

However there are other parties like the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) – dominated by upcountry Tamils, Upcountry Peoples’ Front (UPF) – dominated by upcountry Tamils, Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU) – dominated by Sinhalese and National Unity Alliance (NUA) – dominated by Muslims and these parties do not actively work for sectarianism and racial-federalism. Even their names are not based on racial terminology, but rather based on national concepts. If anyone can see this difference, which is not rocket science, he or she can simply understand that the demand for racial-federalism is stemming from race-centred politicians including Anandasangaree.

Just because unaccomplished Anandasangaree was not invited to the grand gala party thrown by accomplished Parabakaran in 2002, he doesn’t become a moderate. He won the UN peace prize by criticising the CFA as all the political parties that were not invited to sign MoUs with the LTTE also did. All the following parties singed MoUs with the LTTE in 2002 accepting it as the sole representative of Tamils: UNP,TNA,SLMC,CWC,UPF,WPF and the then government! Poor TULF leader was not invited and fell from the Tamil Leader in parliament to nobody in no time. It should also be remembered that he never agreed with Lakshman Kadirgaman – the greatest ever Tamil politician of Sri Lanka whose name was even proposed to the post of PM in 2004.

This country has seen many such politicians who amassed goodwill while hiding their true colours only to unleash their stock most opportunistically. Anandasangaree has a lot to learn from Mangala, SB and Ronnie. Else he can remain a political nobody trying to bypass in vain, elections, the legislature and the peoples’ mandate. He should never be allowed to bypass the elected members and their agenda.

Unitary to United – a Shrewd Attempt to make the Majority a Minority
The 24 year old armed struggle is nearing it’s bloody end. Separatists have used the terror created by the LTTE to demand various benefits for them and for their ideologies. They succeeded in getting some of those demands. However, they are unable to make use of terror when their terror gods are no more. Therefore, they are making some frantic attempts to get whatever they can before the last tiger dies.

One such attempt is changing the national identity from unitary to united. The absurdity of this attempt should be visible to anyone with an appreciation for geography. What is the rationale to divide a land mass the size of Tasmania (a state by itself) into governing units like the West bank, Gaza Strip, etc.?

In that case there will surely be a Sinhala United Liberation Front (SULF), a Sri Lanka Sinhala Congress (SLSC), a Sinhala National Alliance (SNC), Sinhala-nation Peoples’ Revolutionary Lions (SPRL) and a SriLanka Sinhala State Party (SSSP) in the ‘states’ dominated by Tamils and Muslims. What’s more there will even be Liberation Lions of Sinhala Lanka (LLSL)! Is this what we want?

Does Anandasangaree want the sixty-year-old train from India to arrive at the Vavuniya train station packed with corpses (even the drivers were slaughtered in the end)? In that case he will have to drive it as he calls himself a ‘moderate’!!

Racial Federalism
The type of ‘united’ nation proposed is a racial set-up and transcends provincial and district boundaries. North and the East is demanded to be demarcated on ethnic Tamil aspirations; two units of the East would be carved out for Muslims and the upcountry would be separated out for the Tamils of Indian origin. This is a unique blend of racism and federalism. If racism and federalism can sit together, that is sufficient not to have a federalist set-up!

In the case of racial federalism, the Sinhalese living in these four units become a minority! This is not at all acceptable for the national majority. They stand to lose in order to make room for racial federalism. What a big joke? If the country had to face so many complications with just two main minorities, imagine the number of complexities ten such minority groups would bring.

The danger of racial federalism is (as pointed out by many thinkers) that it fuels racial violence. Suppose the rights of the ethnic Tamils living in one Muslim dominated area is violated, this will be mirrored in Tamil dominated areas against its Muslims and vice versa. In a matter of few days the whole country will be in fire. Simple things like water can spark enormous bloodshed throughout the country.

Another danger is ethnic isolation. If each ethnic group is going to be pushed into their little enclaves, these will be breeding grounds of further racism. Iraq is a classic example of such isolation.

Racial federalism is unique to this country as nowhere in the world provincial boundaries have been redrawn along racial lines to set-up a federal system!

Real issues that must be encased into a political solution
It is a fact that ethnic cleansing has taken place in the North and the East. It was mainly the Sinhalese and Muslims who suffered due to this barbarism. In this context, the North is 100% occupied by Tamils whereas there is no district Muslims or Sinhalese dominate to such extent. A united country will cement what the LTTE did by not allowing any other races (other than Tamil) to live and work in the North. Under no circumstances such barbarianism should be reinforced.

Owing to not adjusting parliamentary seat allocations and university allocations based on latest population data, a disproportionately huge advantage has accrued to the Tamils at the expense of the other races. This must be corrected as soon as practical. It should be noted that it was Anandasangaree who intervened in blocking these vital corrections in 2002 stating that the census data were wrong! Also disproportionately smaller tax revenue is collected from the North and the East; this also needs to be adjusted soon. Funding allocations to each province and district should reflect it’s contribution to the total tax revenue. Cross subsidising Tamil majority areas by Sinhala/Muslim majority areas (and vice versa) is definitely not acceptable. These disparities must be straitened before any devolution attempt is made.

An unfair disproportionate access to resources also exists across the races. While Tamils have access to all economic resources in the island, Muslims have lesser access. The worst affected are the Sinhalese. This must be redressed immediately. All natural resources in the North and the East should be made accessible to everyone irrespective of race.

A large number of individuals stay in the country illegally; mainly from south India. They must be repatriated soon and should not be allowed to work in this country. There is no doubt that separatists heavily depend on them to bolster their numbers.

This country has one state language as voted by the people. It must remain so unless the people decide otherwise. Separate states that may be created by a federal structure will definitely undermine this. The national government has an additional burden to protect and promote Sinhala as it is only used in this island nation. No attempts to compromise its position should be allowed.

Separate regions in a federalist set-up will tie up with different countries. Tamil dominated regions will align with India whereas Muslim ones will tie-up with Pakistan. This can create unwarranted trouble in this island. Managing a national foreign policy would be impossible.

It is a matter of few years before the next step of autonomy is made by the separatists. Independent nations would be the next step for them and it will be easy with less control exerted by the national government and increased connections with other nations in the region. This is the ridiculous disintegration of this island most separatists dream of.

Unsustainability
A united country would widely disadvantage the majority which will in turn help amass a political wave that will reverse such devolution. Therefore, a united setting as opposed to a unitary setting is instable and unsustainable. If a united nation doesn’t have any sizable benefits for the majority over a unitary nation, there is no logic in supporting such a move; it will anyway reverse.

Ethnic isolation verses ethnic integration
A federal set-up along ethnic lines will further isolate the races whereas what we need is ethnic integration! However, innocently presented, ethnic isolation is cruel and evil. The only ‘good’ it has is the sustenance of race-centred political parties like the TULF so that losers of general elections can make it to the Parliament.
Common sense (no Tamil Elamist got it) should dictate that an island the size of Tasmania cannot feasibly be subdivided into autonomous or self-governing units.

The Bandaranaike bullshit
There is no truth in allegations that Bandaranaike was at the centre of today’s bloodshed. He made Sinhala Only because a staggering majority voted for it at the elections and in parliament. In wide contrast Hindi Only was never voted by the people of India and passed by a single vote in parliament on 14 September 1949; if allegations against Banda are true, India should have fifty Parabakarans. Almost all democratic countries have only one (1) state language and so should it be in Sri Lanka.

Again he is blamed for tearing his federal proposals under pressure. Who authorised him to bring such proposals? No body. Therefore he has no right to continue with them. However, his problem was not having the courage to stand by the decisions; had he enforced Sinhala Only as Hindi Only was enforced in India, there would never have been any Tamil separatism. One language would have bound all Sri Lankans together as in India, Australia, USA, China, Malaysia, etc.

In fact the demand for Tamil Elam (with the same name) was first made by GG Ponnambalam in 1924 and foretold that there would be violence otherwise.

Even he is not to be blamed for the bloodshed today which was caused by the absence of a proper military strategy during the 1970s. Although the army could muddle a revolution in 1971, it was still a ceremonial army. They had zero experience, knowledge or skill in handling guerrilla warfare. Worst of all, the 1970-77 government stubbornly disregarded repeated warnings of impending danger telling that they have killed enough in the South and would not do the same in the North; had they properly dealt with the killer of Alfred Duriappa (mayor of Jaffna) there would never have been a LTTE. Also there passed seven (7) long years of inaction from the Wadukodai resolution to the commencement of war. Had proper action taken, LTTE and the armed struggle would have aborted then and there. How the LTTE collapsed when the Special Forces took up guerrilla warfare is a case in point. Why wasn’t it done 35 years ago?

However, at least now the authorities should learn; there must be army camps in the North and the East and paramilitants should roam the streets long after this war is won. It is very easy for a band of bandits from Tamil Nadu to land in the North and cause havoc.

Anandasangaree must appreciate that politicians the world over do what their voters want and terrorists on the other hand, do what AK-47s want!

When the UNP accepts its blunders why can’t the TULF do likewise?
According to him the Royal Norwegian Government (there are many allegations of terrorist links against them in Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Ethiopia, etc), “Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the LTTE (that bloody Interpol wanted terrorist), the parties agreed (without the knowledge of their voters) to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination (only the terrorist leader knows what this is as there is no such model in the world) in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples (history of Sri Lanka goes beyond the 14th century and there are no historical scripts, etc. to justify that there lived Tamil speaking people in any part of the country before the 14th century on a continued basis) based on a federal structure within a United Sri Lanka.”

First of all, it was a proposal by Parabakaran! Who cares about his proposals? Of course the UNP did when the LTTE was powerful, but not anymore. Why can’t the TULF follow suit? Because it can never win a seat in parliament!

Fifty one countries, twenty two organisations and four and a half billion dollars
So much to disintegrate the nation. It doesn’t make any financial sense. Sri Lankan oil reserves in the so-called “areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples” exceed 4.5 billion USD! Sri Lankan Phosphate deposits in Seruwila in the so-called “areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples” exceed 4.5 billion USD! Sri Lankan calcium carbonate deposits in the Jaffna peninsula which is in the so-called “areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples” exceed 4.5 billion USD! Sri Lankan mineral sand deposits in Pulmodei which is in the so-called “areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples” exceed 4.5 billion USD! The worth of the Trino, Point Padro and KKS harbours in the so-called “areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples” exceed 4.5 trillion USD!!

Therefore granting self-determination to part of Sri Lanka that will disown assets worth trillions of dollars doesn’t make any financial, economic or political sense.

He also claims that not granting such self-determination will result in Sri Lanka losing its international honour and prestige, which according to him “is more important than anything else”. Wrong; the most important thing is territorial integrity and sovereignty. We have mortgaged our international honour and prestige many a time to defend our territorial integrity and sovereignty just like all the other countries in the world.

The Tamil homeland
If Anandasangaree agrees to a Tamil homeland in this island, he is an ideological twin of Parabakaran; both have close cousins in Iraq, East Timor, Yugoslavia, Chechnya, etc. If the supporters of racial-federalism have a hint of belief that there is a Tamil homeland in this island, it is time they look at the real Tamil homeland across the Palk Strait. All Tamil songs, movies, sangeetham, natyam, arangeethram, dramas, literature, masterpieces and all other Tamil artefacts are made there. None are made in this island. This is the reality today. No amount of ethnic cleansing can chase away the brave Muslims and scary Sinhalese from the East and no amount of artillery can scare-off the gallant Sri Lankan army from the North. We are here to stay and fight till the last armed Tamil liberator falls dead. And there should be no mercy for the coward hiding behind the child soldier, the pregnant suicide killer and the brain-raped wonder-bra wearing suicide killer-girl.

The Tamil struggle is nearing its bloody end as stated by many foreign defence analysts; without the Tamil Homeland. At least now all moderate and violent Tamil Elamists should stop their struggle and war and look elsewhere for the Tamil Elam; ironically it does exist!

Should India or Malaysia be our role model?
These two countries have used opposite methods to ‘solve’ their ethnic issues. India used separation (Pakistan) and a federal system to ‘solve’ its ethnic related issues. However, these remain far from resolved. A persistent war with Pakistan and more than 25 separatist movements within India, plagues it. Although kept hidden from the world, these internal conflicts (fought along ethnic lines) have made their headlines the world over. Bihar, Kashmir, Mysoor, Assam and many more states are fighting for separation from India for independence; spates of bombings have rocked India signalling the gathering storm. Today the Indian Central government begs at the feet of Tamil Nadu LTTE-worshiping politicians just to stay in power. They are willing to forgive and forget anything that makes the TNs happy; even the killing of their former leader! They declare nuclear facilities as ‘no fly zones’ fearing the Nuxalites will come in Cessnas from Vanni and bomb them! But they are spineless to ward-off the danger. If we follow India, Mr Sangaree, this is where we will end-up!

On the other hand Malaysia also faced ethnic strife and they gave it a different solution. Although administrative provinces exist, Malaysia strengthened the centre as the all powerful governing body and powered the nationalist cause and empowered the majority who were supportive of a unitary Malaysia (although it is de jure federal, characteristically regional legislatures are immensely eclipsed by the centre and have no ethnicity based representation as each state has a unicameral state legislative chamber whose members are elected from single-member constituencies). This solved its conflicts for good; there are no further separatist movements in Malaysia; no bombs go off; no leader is bombed. If anyone wanted to create a Tamil homeland in Malaysia (they tried it), they were rather redirected to where the Tamil homeland is, Tamil Nadu. Some landed in Sri Lanka by mistake. Same with those struggled to carve out a Chinese homeland there.

(http://www.lankaweb.com)

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Dr Rajan Hoole, a Tamil rights activist who won the Martin Ennals award recently, has warned the Sri Lankan government against killing the LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran’s destruction through military action would only result in his becoming a more dangerous legend among the Tamil people than he was already, he said.

“Treating the destruction of Prabhakaran as an end in itself, would make him an even more dangerous legend among the Tamils everywhere,” Hoole said in a statement on monday.

Reacting to the Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s declaration that there would be a political settlement only after the Tamil Tigers were militarily crushed, Hoole said that this was putting the cart before the horse, and would be completely counter productive.

He said that a reasonable political solution, taking into account the long standing aspirations of the Tamils, would have to be offered to the Tamil people as a priority. That would enable them to reject the LTTE’s violence, intolerance and separatism.

“The LTTE must be defeated, but the way it is defeated is crucial. Its ultimate defeat could only be achieved by the Tamil people given adequate democratic opportunity,” the activist said.

Hoole, who heads the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), said that without a political solution on offer, it would be very difficult for the Tamil moderates to wean the Tamil masses away from the LTTE.

Tamil moderates, like himself, were having great difficulty trying to convince ordinary Tamils living in the neighbourhood and the Diaspora, that the LTTE had been committing crimes against the Tamils themselves, Hoole said. He was often reprimanded by the Tamil people for exposing the LTTE’s violence. Their argument was that there was a powerful government in Colombo “committing terrible atrocities” against the Tamils which had to be fought and in that context, it would not be prudent to expose the wrong doings of the LTTE.

Hoole said that the Sri Lankan government was wrong in taking Indian support for granted. According to him Indian were feeling that if the Sri Lankan government continued to be insensitive to the political demands of the Tamils and concentrated only on military action, a separate “Eelam” might be inevitable.

“Disregarding Tamil aspirations and stocking up an excess of hardware to defeat him (Prabhakaran) militarily, would make him a more dangerous legend, dead or living. People would then remember him not as a villain who brought ruin on the Tamils, but as the man who understood the Sinhalese polity and refused to bow down,” Hoole warned.

(http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?id=6468abcc-2719-49b1-988b-00234579bf97)

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