Home, mosque and hospital unsafe
The writer Senior Assistant Editor, Herald in Pakistan presented this paper at the South Asian Free Media Association regional workshop on intrastate conflict held in Colombo over the weekend.
Pakistan’s founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah, during one of his famous speeches to the Constituent Assembly had declared on August 11, 1947: “You may belong to any religion or caste or creed… that has nothing to do with the business of the state. You are free, free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan”.
However, 57 years later, one wonders what has gone wrong with Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s Pakistan where the rival sect members are carrying out suicide attacks in crowded mosques beside using automatic weapons and hand grenades that kill both their targets and bystanders. Historically speaking, it was the death of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) that led to a dispute over the question of his successor, eventually dividing the Islamic community in two sects – Shia and Sunni, which gradually multiplied into numerous sub-sects with fragmented doctrine.
As things appear, the genie of sectarian violence in Pakistan refuses to be bottled and threatens the very fabric of the society. Even as General Pervez Musharraf exhorts the people of Pakistan to adapt enlightened moderation, the country’s tentative quest for a non-discriminatory liberal democracy continues to unravel.
Pakistan continues to be caught in the trap of extremist Islamist militancy and terror that its military establishment constructed as part of its Afghan and Kashmir policies.
The overt and covert support of Pakistan’s military establishment to the militants fighting in Jammu and Kashmir had in some way promoted sectarian violence in Pakistan. The growing nexus between the Pakistan-based sectarian outfits and the militant organisations active in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan has lately aggravated sectarian violence in the country. Originally a product of Pakistan’s military establishment to beef up its security vis-a-vis India, these militant groups now visibly threaten the country’s internal security.
While Pakistani military establishment’s support for these outfits has kept the Indian army tied down in Jammu and Kashmir, it has created a serious principal agent problem for Pakistan on the domestic front. The linkages between militants active in Jammu and Kashmir or Afghanistan and those within Pakistan are not surprising since these jihadis share the same madrassas, training camps and operatives. By facilitating the actions of irregulars in the Kashmir valley, Pakistan actually promoted sectarian jihad and terrorism back home.
While attacking the religious extremists in his speeches, General Musharraf often claims that only one per cent of these extremists are holding hostage the other 99 per cent moderates. But the General’s rhetoric apart, even a common man knows quite well that most of the leading jihadi outfits that had been patronized in the past have a direct or indirect hand in promoting sectarian violence in Jinnah’s Pakistan.
Facing international criticism over its status as a host to several Islamic extremist elements, the Musharraf administration has, from time to time, sought to take steps to deflect criticism of the activities of the fundamentalist elements within Pakistan. However, some inner contradictions within the ruling establishment are bound to hamper these efforts.
For decades, Pakistan’s Shia and Sunni communities lived side by side without developing any major problems. The conflicts between Shias and Sunnis began to escalate about two decades ago in the wake of two epic movements taking place in neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan. The first was the famous Islamic revolution of 1979 in overwhelmingly Shia Iran, which inspired many of the Pakistani Shias to demand more rights for their minority. The second was the decade-long war the Sunni Afghan Mujahideen waged against the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan.
In other words, the Iranian revolution and the Afghan resistance movement stimulated the Shia and the Sunni sectarian movements in Pakistan. While the Shias claim they are 20 per cent of the total Pakistani population, the Sunnis insist that the Shias only constitute 7-8 per cent of the country’s 150 million Populace. Over 2,000 Shias and Sunnis have been killed and around 4,000 injured in more than 2200 sectarian incidents in Pakistan during January 1988 to October 2004.
With dollars coming from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the days of Pakistan’s third military ruler, General Ziaul Haq, Islamabad’s assistance promoted the proliferation of a huge number of militant groups and religious seminaries inside the country. At that time, the United States needed Islamists to wage holy war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, while Islamabad needed them to bring in billions of US dollars. Therefore, the Reagan administration and the Zia junta, both turned a blind eye to their radical ideology and methods. The shortsightedness of the American administration became apparent soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
As the Pakistani establishment was busy creating the ghost of radical Islamists in Afghanistan in the shape of Taliban, their jihadi brethren had already resorted to sectarian killings inside Pakistan. Each act of sectarian killing used to provoke a cycle of revenge killings, with the government of the day failing to curb the menace. The very failure subsequently provided the fanatics and extremists to flourish and grow in strength, with most of the Shia and Sunni sectarian groups being sponsored by Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively.
As a natural consequence, after seizing power in October 1999, Pakistan’s fourth military ruler, General Pervez Musharaff, had to face a formidable foe: well armed, well-trained, well-financed and well-entrenched sectarian organisations with a huge resource pool of recruits in thousands of religious madrassas across Pakistan. And dealing with such a mighty and organised foe was never going to be easy for an un-elected leader.
But his task was made somewhat easier by the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States and the worldwide backlash against extremist Islam that it unleashed. The Musharraf regime’s U-turn on the Kashmir issue and his decision to limit support for the Kashmiri militants, also boosted its drive against sectarian groups. Before that, many sectarian groups had emerged and were being tolerated because of their links with groups waging a ‘holy war’ in Jammu and Kashmir.
Once the Musharraf administration decided to put the Kashmir issue on the back burner for the sake of better ties with India, it no longer had to put up with the jihadi groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. The first clear sign of a shift in Islamabad’s stated policy on Kashmir came through Musharraf’s 12th January 2002 televised speech. While announcing a massive campaign to eradicate the sectarian menace, he banned three leading sectarian groups, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehreek-e-fafria Pakistan (TJP) and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM). Six months later [on August 14, 2002], the General decided to ban two more sectarian outfits – Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) and Lashkar-e-fhangvi (LeJ) – declaring them terrorist outfits.
However, the organizational infrastructures of the banned sectarian groups continue to function under new names and the same office bearers. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad remain underground. Other banned groups are still operating mostly out of their old office premises. Some of them have shifted to new premises. They are still bringing out the same periodical publications, mostly under the old names. They are discreetly raising funds and holding ijtimas (consensus) without any fear.
Though the Sunni-Shia conflict is centuries old, its more modern and virulent manifestation in Pakistan can be traced to Imam Khomeini’s successful Iranian revolution and the setting up of a Shia state there. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-faferia (Movement for Enforcement of the Shariat Laws) or TNFJ was the first sectarian organisation founded in Pakistan soon after the Iranian revolution of 1979. The organisation emerged to demand religious rights for the Shia minority in Pakistan, including a separate syllabus of Islamic learning and national public holidays on Shia mourning days.
In response, extremist Sunni groups began to espouse the cause of transforming Pakistan into a Sunni state where Shias were to be made a non-Muslim minority. The military regime of Zia fostered the growth of sectarianism in a number of ways. He created a perception among the Shia community that his government was moving rapidly towards establishing a Sunni state in which the Islamisation of the Shariat laws was seen to reflect the Islam of the dominant sect.
However, the 1980 siege of the government secretariat in Islamabad by tens of thousands of Shias protesting against the proposed Islamisation of the Shariat laws forced General Zia to succumb to most of the Shia community’s demands. But at the same time, his government continued the selective backing of the Sunnis-led Afghan mujahideen groups resisting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, which corresponded to a sectarian pattern of preferences in the country that reinforced perceptions on both sides of the divide.
The emergence of the Sunni sectarian outfit – the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in the 1980s was apparently a reaction to the TNFJ, although its rapid rise is also attributed to the money it received from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and a few other Sunni-dominated Arab states, which perceived the Iranian revolution as a threat. But after the Gulf War of 1991, neither a defeated Iraq was in a position to support anti-Shia outfits, nor was US-friendly Saudi Arabia interested in funding countries that had sided with Saddam Hussein.
At this stage, the Pakistani establishment tried to persuade the Sipah-e-Sahaba leadership to give up its militancy. The mainstream organisation agreed, yet a rebellious splinter group emerged in the form of the Lashkar-e-fhangvi (LeJ), with the sole objective of killing Shias, while describing them infidels. The emergence of LeJ gave birth to a splinter group among Shias – the Sipah-e-Mohammad. While the LeJ gradually flourished in the Taliban-run military training camps in Afghanistan, the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) militants were trained in Iran. By the end of the Zia rule, the consequences of his policies were fairly obvious. Over the last decade, there has been a major escalation in sectarian tension, the number of sectarian killings and armed sectarian groups. Among those outfits that have gained particular prominence are the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), an off-shoot of Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-fafaria, the main politico-religious Shia party in Pakistan, later renamed Tehrik-e-fafaria Pakistan (TFP) and the other being Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, later renamed Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan (SSP), an off-shoot of the famiat Ulema-e-Islam (JVI), a leading politico-religious Sunni Oeobandi party. A further offshoot of the SSP, considered to, be the most violent sectarian outfit, is the even more militant Lashkar-e-fhangvi(LeJ).
The present state of organised sectarian conflict can be traced back to the murder of TNFJ leader Arif Hussaini in 1988. Others date it to 1987, when Ahl-e-Hadith leaders, Allama Ehsan Elahi Zaheer and Maulana Habib ur Rehman Yazdani were killed, along with six others, at a meeting near the Minar-e-Pakistan. Prior to this, there were serious anti-Shia riots in Lahore in 1986. In any case, the spiral of violence registered a sharp rise in February 1990 with the murder of Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, founder of the SSP. This was followed by violent clashes resulting in dozens of casualties and burning down of numerous houses and shops in Jhang.
The pattern and scale of violence indicates some key features. The contending groups are well organised and well armed. Their ability to maintain their effectiveness and to elude the law enforcement agencies also has to do with an extensive support network that includes madrassas, political parties, bases across the border and financial support from foreign countries if not foreign governments. It is generally believed that something of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is going on in Pakistan, with different groups in Afghanistan weighing in as well.
In the process, the state authority stands eroded by the sectarian groups in one way or the other. The hate literature and cassettes from the two sides – easily available across the country – clearly violate the law of the land but seldom invite sanction. Offences such as murder and destruction of property do get a state response but it lacks the will to take the difficult steps necessary to deal with the phenomenon. A narrow law and order approach, with a police force unequipped to deal with highly motivated, well trained and well organised militants, has obviously not had much of an impact, particularly when the latter have state-of-the-art weapons.
The Muslims of Pakistan, both Shias and Sunnis, have apparently forgotten that religious exclusivism was the sole basis to the concept of Muslims as a separate nation, which divided the Indian sub-continent. Thus, the question of separate identity of Muslims in post partition India remains unresolved. The simmering Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan shows that there are virtually no sanctuaries left – neither home, nor mosque or the hospital. And being innocent is not the issue. Just ‘being’ is enough – being Shia or Sunni, Barelvi or Deobandi. One explanation for this is that in a situation where different sectarian groups are vying to prove themselves the standard bearers of Islam, one option is to stand out as being closer to ‘true Islam’ by displaying extreme hostility and intolerance to those designated as being un-Islamic by virtue of belonging to religious minorities and minority sects.
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