LTTE infiltration attempt halted : Manalkadu

Two LTTE cadres who attempted to infiltrate into the Jaffna peninsula via sea were shot dead by the army and navy today dawn. It is believed that the LTTE cadres were engaged in an intelligence gathering/sabotage mission.

Navy’s Fast Attack Craft patrolling the seas off Point Pedro were the first to make the discovery. The small boat carrying LTTE cadres was moving north hugging the coastline. Upon detection, Navy’s Special Boat Squadron was deployed to neutralize the enemy threat. SBS fire instantly killed one cadre but the other managed to swim shore. He was later killed by SLA ground forces deployed in the area.

The actual target of the LTTE cadres is not confirmed as of yet.

These are some images of navy SBS commandos during a training exercise in Trincomalee.

 

(http://defencenet.blogspot.com/2007/08/ltte-infiltration-attempt-halted.html)

Read Full Post »

Did LTTE receive early information on Army’s Silawathura offensive?

Few days ago, the Sri Lanka Army launched a medium scale offensive to capture Silawathurei area; a known sea tiger launching pad and a major LTTE supply hub. The operation was a top secret one and was well planned. It went according to plan except for one little unexpected twist; the heavy resistance which was expected from the LTTE was almost non existent. When the army’s crack troops paradropped from Mi-17 helicopters, there were no tigers left to defend their turf. They had either fled into the jungles or had mixed in with the civilians. Did LTTE plan their retreat early? Did they receive early intel on a top secret military offensive? These are questions to which we may never know the answers.

When Special Forces reached the Silawathura sea tiger base premises, it had already been abandoned by the tigers. Only around 12 tigers were killed in the entire offensive. However the military was able to recover war related hardware from the base premises:

• 25 Fiber Glass boats
• 1 small boat loaded with explosives (possibly suicide craft)
• 29 boat engines
• 110  40mm mortar rounds
• 269 81mm mortar round
• 5000 assault rifle ammunition
• 1 suicide jacket

But was this all the LTTE had in Silawathura? We don’t think so. They maintained a major sea tiger base and had some valuable military hardware stationed there. The base was commanded by “Nambi” and it was defended by nearly 200 LTTE cadres (approximately 80 sea units and 120 land units). Previous military intelligence reports suggested that LTTE had the following military hardware stationed in the base:

• 10 small sea tiger attack craft
• 5 sea tiger craft fitted with 14.5mm cannons
• 2 sea tiger craft fitted with 23mm cannons
• 2 supply vessels fitted with 14.5mm cannons
• 3 explosive laden suicide boats

One might think that the army had recovered all these boats after reading the previous paragraph. Army actually did find 25 Fibre Glass boats in the base but they were not attack craft. They seemed more likely to be fishing boats which the LTTE used as supply gatherers. What happened to the attack craft, weapons and ammunition storage? Did the LTTE move them to a safer location before the army advance? If so, where was the leak? These questions will no doubt trouble army’s veteran commanders who planned and lead the Silawathura offensive.

(http://defencenet.blogspot.com/2007/09/did-ltte-receive-early-information-on.html)

Read Full Post »

Killinochchi on High Alert

Read Full Post »

Anniversary of the STF to be commemorated

You are our strength — You are our life — You are our path to success

The dawn of the 1980’s saw the emergence of new trends and dimensions of subversive terror in the northern part of Sri Lanka, where the bane of humanity which is terrorism started gradually raising its head. Tamil National Leadership, moderates, bureaucrats were targeted whilst inflicting a fear psychosis in the mindset of the public in the North. Next victims were the police who were busy ensuring law and order was followed in the Northern peninsula. Assassinations, robberies and disruptive activities in the government infrastructure developed into separatism by violent means. The police being the premier law enforcing authority was first to face the onslaught of a violent campaign of terror unleashed to achieve their goal. There were attacks on police personal whilst on duty and later on the police stations which completely disrupted the normalcy prevailing in the north.

The new security challenges posed by the advent of separatist terror in the north, heightened the need for a special paramilitary arm within the police service, prompted by the killing of policemen and isolated police stations becoming targets of attacks. Initiatives were taken on the immediately formation of a paramilitary arm, capable of meeting the threat, which saw the emergence of the Special Paramilitary Strike Force (SSF). The outfit was deployed in the north exclusively to counter the emerging threat. The lack of will, manpower and the material support made the SSF fragile and denied its infrastructure for prolonged sustenance.

It is in this light that the Special Task Force, now a household word in Sri Lanka, was born in 1983, headed by Bodhi Liyanage, Superintendent of Police, who is a Senior Deputy Inspector General today. Special units of any armed force are created only when that force faces serious threats. The formation of the Special Task Force of the Sri Lanka police is a case in point.

After the initial training at Police College, Katukurunda, the 1 intake of recruits were inducted to the army combat training school, Ampara for counter revolutionary warfare. The Ministry of Defense, which had been closely monitoring the progress and the performances, decided to streamline this unit by providing them with specialized training and equipment required to function more effectively. The MOD, took an active interest in realizing its objectives and as a result the services of a special air service, who were involved in training Special Forces in the Sultanate of Oman, were obtained to make the STF a more professional outfit.

The SAS experts trained the STF troops at the Katukurunda wing of the police college, after turning the training school into a sophisticated training complex. Later, STF experts took over from the SAS experts in 1988. Today the STF has a fully-fledged training wing, regarded as one of the best in South East Asia. The name of Upali Sahabandu, the late DIG, whose dedicated and committed services elevating the training school to this status, has to be mentioned, as a mark of respect. The Special Task Force has been headed by seven Commandants since its inception starting from Bodhi Liyanage- now Senior DIG, Dharmasiri Weerakoon- DIG, Zerney Wijesuriya- Senior DIG, Lionel Karunasena- Senior DIG, Dharmasiri Weerakoon- DIG (second stint), Nimal Gunatilleke —Senior DIG. The present incumbent, Nimal Lewke- DIG, who joined the force in 1984 as an inspector, marshals this elite outfit as its seventh commandant.

The STF at the initial stages was deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, to assist the police in 1983. It is with great respect we commemorate the first martyrs of the STF, who laid down their lives in combat to preserve the unity and integrity of the motherland. On September 1984, Police Constables 2539 Chandrapala, 4100 Ekanayake, 3928 Nanayakkara and Police Constable Driver 13089 Sumanasekera were killed at Tikkum in Jaffna, falling victim to a land-mine explosion, set off by the LTTE.

Since September 1, 1983 the STF commemorates its’ war heroes and the 23rd anniversary of which falls today. Towards the end of 1984, the Ministry of Defense decided to relocate the STF from North to the East. There was skepticism among some quarters to this move. The STF however, took up this challenge and relieved the SL army who were moved to the North. The STF made rapid progress in the East, establishing firm ground control and normalizing civil administration, after many confrontations from the enemy.

When the operational functions were given over to the IPKF in 1987, the STF was in total control, dominating the districts of Batticoloa and Ampara as well. By this time, the STF firmly established itself as a professional fighting unit, well conversant with unconventional warfare. The STF became a safety valve for terror stricken citizens in the East. STF troops were regarded as battle-hardened, fearless fighters with the capability to face any form of internal threat. It always believed in providing security to the public, in a holistic way, covering all ingredients of security, economic, social and mental well being. A high degree of discipline, maintained throughout, made their character much stronger, enabling the STF to command respect from both public as well as the enemy. The Special Task Force is guided by the adage, “Attack is the Best Form of Defense”. This approach of the STF earned tremendous confidence and respect from authorities.Although the original intention was to limit the strength of personal to 500, based on the performance of this outfit, the government effected broad-based infrastructure improvements, which led to further expansion by 1987. Increase of strength and seeking new avenues to serve, providing security to VVIPs was considered after a grenade attack in parliament in August 1987. The threats to VIPs increased during that time and the Government requested the STF to undertake matters pertaining to VIP security and a team was trained and detailed on how to handle the security of VVIPs, including the President.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/08/25/feat/3.asp)

Read Full Post »

Saga of war and peace in the East

Remembering Mutur, 2006

The eviction of 251 resettled farmers from Arafa Nagar on 10th, August, without prior notice by the military, demonstrates that it is not purely security concerns that keep the Tamils out of their lands. Such actions lead us to believe that at least in some instances obstacles placed in the way of resettlement are prompted more by ethnic considerations and than by security safeguards. These Muslim families with permission from the then military commander began cultivation in March 2007. On the 10th, of this month, the military commanded the families to move out, placed a board at the entrance of the village allegedly stating that the area was a HSZ and that anyone who entered would be shot. Though negotiations are under way over this controversy, we learn that the area has been fenced off and the people are allowed only to cultivate and not re-settle on the land. The Muslim community continues to live in a state of anxiety and vulnerability, reliant on the whims and fancies of the military. According to a recent newspaper report (Daily Mirror), the President’s brother Basil Rajapakse had informed a Muslim delegation that met with him to raise concerns about Arafa Nagar and other instances of dispossession, that he would look into the matter and that the government had initiated a dialogue with the World Bank to procure compensation for those affected by the conflict. This raises the question about the role of donors and international agencies in developing the East – will they help in the re-drawing of ‘ethnic’ boundaries and the shifting of populations too?
Under the guise of national security – of protecting Trincomalee Harbour, the government has made plans for the development of Trincomalee. One of its development plans is to build a coal power station in Sampur, even though the Indian engineers, who were to be engaged in the project, have rejected the suitability of the site. The development of Trincomalee is important but it is increasingly clear that this is a development programme that pays little attention to local communities, and instead is formulated toward enticing big business. Local communities have been re-grafted onto the plan and shifted whenever they are ‘in the way’. A massive highway has been constructed by the army, cutting across many paddy fields in Kinanthimunai, Perumpathu and Vellalanwetai. There is little evidence that any proper procedure was followed in acquiring this agricultural land. The farmers had no intimation of what was going on for they had been barred from entering their villages by the military as the area has been declared a HSZ.

Furthermore, it seems that as a part of these developments a new and trustworthy work force and new communities (read Sinhala) will be moved into Trincomalee, dramatically impacting on the demography and the ethnic balance in the Trincomalee District. Already local communities are expressing fears that their areas are being marginalized and their needs and rights are being ignored in the proposed development plans. In the political climate that has evolved out of the ethnic conflict, where development has been deployed as a tool for advantaging one community over another, be it land colonization schemes or the Mahaweli Project, and thereby impacting, sometimes intentionally, on population ratios and patterns of distribution of ethno-political communities, this current development plan for Trincomalee or the soon to be unveiled Eastern Development Plan is viewed with deep mistrust. This concern of minority communities needs to be addressed and their fears allayed as speedily as possible.

Like in Pottuvil, where the Muslim community is facing a four pronged strategy to reclaim land through violence, national security, the protection of religious and cultural heritage and environmental conservation, the Tamil and Muslim Community seem to face similar threats in the region of Trincomalee. As a part of the BOI, Trincomalee Development Plan, a nature park is to be established in the district. In Seenanveli, north of Illankaiturai Muhattuvaram, a HSZ and a special fishing zone are being imposed on the inhabitants of the area. The residents, most of them Tamils of Veddha descent, from about 8 villages, have been transported and virtually dumped in the open. They are prevented from going home on the pretext of landmines while their meagre possessions have been reportedly looted by ‘Sinhalese’ from the Mahindapura colony, acting in cooperation with the Army. The army is also engaged in constructing a Buddhist Temple, Samudragiri Vihara, in Seenanveli.

There have been recent efforts to claim a stone quarry site, the hill area of 3rd mile post in Jabal Nagar, by the archaeological department, despite the fact that this very archaeological department had, twice in the past, carried out investigations and found nothing to prove by way of any existence of ancient Buddhist ruins. While the state is seemingly concerned about preserving ‘ancient’ history, the livelihood of people currently living in the region, of around 400 Tamil and Muslim families in Mutur, is being destroyed. There are also plans underway to settle some Sinhala families on a land that was allocated for about 60 tsunami-affected families of Mutur. ‘Emergency Architects’ were given the contract to build houses in this area, but we hear that 2 ½ acres of this land called ‘theatre land’ has been fenced off and claimed by a group of Sinhalese, who had not been affected by the tsunami, with help of military, police and a Viharathipathy.

July and August: a time to mourn
July and August have always been times of significant development in Sri Lanka’s history. In these months we commemorate a number of critical events that dramatically altered and darkened the course of our history; events that we want to forget and to ignore. It is the 24th year since Black July – the state-sponsored pogrom against Tamil civilians which to this day is remembered mainly by its victims and some concerned civil society groups, while the mainstream media, general society and political leadership try to distance themselves from playing any part in remembering those dark days. Or it is remembered ironically as a month necessitating heightened security, particularly in Colombo as fears of LTTE attacks in the city intensify.

The commemorations by the forces of death however continue with Jaffna and Vavuniya once again becoming a killing field, with the government forces, the LTTE, the Karuna Group and other paramilitary forces acting out, determined to eliminate an entire generation of Tamil youth. During Black July, in the Wanni, the LTTE celebrated its festival of death in a roll call of the Maveerars. Its commemoratory events have no space for the ordinariness of life: lives of these ‘martyrs’ who also died as daughters, sons, brothers and sisters. There is no space within the stranglehold of the LTTE for the ‘civilian’ to mourn her brethren. At Independence Square on July 19, when the Government celebrated its military conquests and extolled the virtues of the armed struggle, there was no space to talk of the cost, no time to talk of reconciliation, no need to talk of human suffering, no reason to acknowledge the civilian casualties of this military campaign.

July 2007 marked the 50th anniversary of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact and the 20th anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement, both audacious, if inherently flawed efforts that could have succeeded if there had been a genuine political will to push them through. Instead the duplicitous and cowardly politics of the Sinhala political leadership of the time – S.W.R.D Bandaranaike and J.R. Jayewardene – ensured that the agreement would be undermined and destroyed.

We see this subversive and destructive tendency at play in the manipulative strategies of the current Government, which called for an All Party Conference to arrive at a Southern Consensus and has at the same time done its best to undercut those self same efforts. We previously lodged our protest at the regressive SLFP proposals that completely undermined all efforts at peace building and made a mockery of the intelligence and experience that has gone into previous attempts at negotiated settlements and of the tragic sacrifices made by people like Neelan Thiruchelvam, Kethesh Loganathan, Lakshman Kadirgamar, and so many other less prominent people, all of whom died in the name of peace and amity. It was in the months of July and August that these Neelan, Kethesh and Lakshman Kadirgamar were assassinated. We pray that this year we will not have to mourn another important figure.

While we might contest and not agree with their politics or policies, in their lives they sought to bring about a peaceful and just resolution to the ethnic conflict through debate and discussion; their murders represent a decimation of Tamil society and intelligentsia by a group, the LTTE, that is paranoid and power hungry, and has failed to understand the irreparable damage it has caused to Tamil society through its violence and its failure to commit itself to negotiations. While Minister Tissa Vitharana struggles to bring a consensus-document to the table, the government too compliant to supposed Sinhala-Buddhist interests seems more interested in it as a device to present its peace making credentials to the international community rather than as a genuine effort to create a national consensus. We hope that Minister Vitharana and his committee will be supported in the defiant stand they have adopted and hope that the media will support them in their efforts, affirming the values of social justice and harmony, ethnic and otherwise.

The time has come for the government to stand high and clear above narrow ethnic or chauvinist interests and affirm its commitment to peace, where there is justice for all communities, inculcating in all of the peoples, a sense of belonging. The choice is not just between war and peace, but also between justice, democracy, a soul searching exploration on the part of dominant groups into the causes of the conflict on one side and continued violence and instability on the other. Our concerns about the east and the simmering situation prevalent there, in the wake of liberation, should be a wake up call for all those concerned about the future of this country.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/08/25/opinion/3.asp)

Read Full Post »

Why Prabhakaran loves elections

It never rains but it pours. The LTTE has faced a string of military debacles during the past few months. The sinking by the Navy of three LTTE vessels carrying urgently needed military material and aircraft on Monday and Tuesday is by far the worst ever disaster the outfit has suffered. It is desperate for the replenishment of its arsenal which is depleted as the offensives since the Mavil Aru battle have drained its lethal stocks heavily. Of late, the LTTE has cut down on the use of its big guns and the indications are that it is terribly short of artillery shells, a prerequisite for countering a possible foray by the army into the Wanni. Prabhakaran must be really paranoid with the threat of an onslaught on his stronghold looming large. Else, he wouldn’t have called for three arms shipments simultaneously and put, in the process, all his eggs in one basket, which the Navy crushed in style. The recent downgrading of Sea Tiger chief Soosai’s position following a series of humiliating losses in sea battles and the clashes between the Soosai faction and the gangs loyal to LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman in Norway are indicative of the growing frustration and desperation of Prabhakaran and his loyalists.

When Prabhakaran had a group of about one hundred naval personnel on non-combat duty killed at a transit point in Habarana by a truck bomb sometime ago, he may have thought he had broken the Navy’s back. But, as the wise old folk say in this country, ‘dawn doesn’t come after just only one dream’. The sinking of the three floating military warehouses has come as a nightmare for him.

The war may not be over but a cursory look at Prabhakaran’s report card will show a number of ‘Fs’, beginning from the Mavil Aru battle last year. He is certainly in trouble with the myth of his invincibility in tatters. After over two decades of fighting, he has reached a stage where he can neither go on the offensive nor defend himself on his own and is dependent on his sympathizers in NGOs and elsewhere for survival. Some of them, we learn, have gone abroad in a bid to give the LTTE oxygen by generating international pressure to restrain the government from launching offensive operations in the Wanni. Nedumaran is dying to come here with provisions. Reports from India at the time of writing said he had been arrested in that country together with a band of his supporters. The pro-LTTE NGO lobby is busy organising lectures and workshops where foreign speakers try to give the government the jitters and confuse the armed forces. Some western diplomats are running helter-skelter like the ‘canine with petrol poured on their posterior’ in a frantic effort to prevent a full scale offensive in the North. They may claim their concern for the collateral damage as the reason but if that is so why aren’t they trying to stop the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, where a far worse situation prevails? However, even if they succeeded in thwarting military operations in the North, Prabhakaran wouldn’t be safe as cracks have already appeared in his once monolithic organisation. The on-going clashes between Soosai and Pottu Amman are a case in point. On the other hand, with an effective naval blockade scuttling his arms smuggling operations-there may be only a few more of his ships left-he has no hope of regaining his military strength. Worse, the people trapped in the areas under his control are desperate to flee and this will surely compel him to resort to much more repressive methods to make them toe the line thus making himself too embarrassing even to his international allies. How long can a man who is being projected as Sun God go on like that? It is doubtful whether his massive ego will allow him to be checkmated by the government so ignominiously.

Prabhakaran may not have representation in at least a humble Pradeshiya Sabha but paradoxically he loves elections. For, every deus ex machina for him in the past has come in the form of an election. In the late 1980s, he was saved by the election of the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who sent the IPKF home at a time they were poised to take Prabhakaran. In 1994, President D. B. Wijetunge was on the warpath determined to crush the LTTE, when Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected President and a truce followed giving him a breather.

He must have been disappointed greatly last Thursday, when the government managed to get its Finance Amendment Bills ratified, dashing his hopes of a premature dissolution of Parliament. However, he cannot be bearing the Rathu Sahodarayas ill will any longer. He must be one of their great fans after their performance in the House on that day. Although they failed to defeat the bills in question, they really made an effort to do so even at the risk of hara-kiri. This is not the first time the Rathu Sahodarayas have come to his rescue in spite of their much flaunted opposition to separatist terror. What a battle they fought to chase the IPKF out before it made mince meat of the Tigers! They killed thousands of people and destroyed state property worth billions of rupees to achieve that objective which stood Prabhakaran in good stead. (Ironically, today, they are prostrating themselves before the Indian leaders beseeching their intervention!)

So, Prabhakaran, wherever he may be, must be hoping and praying that President Rajapaksa will continue to bungle on the political front and get wrong-footed. Hope springs eternal …

(http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20070913_03)

Read Full Post »

The Eastern theatre

A simmering landscape ready to explode with fury

From 1977 attempts to accommodate district and regional voices in the governance of the districts and province has been attempted. It includes the Provincial administration and what it represents. Another actor is the intervention of funds and agencies. hey need space and sensitive knowledge. The interventions may not though go beyond a cautious process of intervention since formal structures of peace are not in place. For them the dilemma is to know what can go wrong and to do nothing. Or to advice in hindsight what may follow if the fundamentals are not in place as referred earlier. The Northern theatre presents another set of issues in terms of Jaffna and the Vanni regions; a simmering landscape at a minimum ready to explode with fury at any moment. The region has a significant presence of civilians amidst a tense military build up on all sides.The third dimension is related political battles principally between the Government and the Opposition led by the National Congress. In this scenario, those at the helm have a formidable agenda for stewardship while managing war and conflict.

We seem to have a few options playing simultaneously when looking at the theatre at the moment. This is not the Wada Bari Tarzan type theatre. It is different battles in three geographical zones. These include the North, East and the political battles in the South.

Since the east is under Government control, the Eastern recovery effort is revving up. Extracts from a presentation recently is found below:

Overall Objective
To extend maximum benefits to the people with the participation of NGOs/INGOs in the recovery and rebuilding process of the ‘Sun Rising Region’ Of Sri Lanka.

Specific Objectives

• To utilize Financial, Material and Manpower Resources effec tively and efficiently
  
• To develop the entire Region beneficial to all ethnic groups in an equitable manner to with a view to obtain balance growth and development of the region.
  
• To accelerate the Implementa tion of Programmes / Projects Identified and prioritized by the Government with the assistance and coordination by Hon. Minis ters/Members of Parliament, Provincial Council, Municipal Council, Pradeshiya Saba Mem bers, all security forces, citizens committee / Development Com mittee/ Community Based or ganizations and officials of the respective Ministries at all level.
  
• To enhance Agricultural produc tion in the Region by giving high priority to implement the Agri culture and Irrigation related programmes/Projects.
  
• To Rehabilitate and Reconstruct the Basic amenities such as Drinking Water facilities, Sanita tion, Surface Drainage System, Access Roads.
  
• To promote and implement liveli hood programmes and income generation activities.
• To enhance Skill Development through Vocational Training.
  
• To attend Rehabilitation, Recon struction and Development Ac tivities
  
• To provide Social and Economic Infrastructural facilities.
  
• To undertake / assist the imple mentation of Housing compo nents for the resettlers.
  
• To promote the development of fisheries, livestock and animal husbandry using modern techni ques.
  
• To assist / promote the estab lishment of Rural Industries, Small and Medium scale Indus tries.
  
• To assist / promote Trading fa cilities in marketing of local pro duce products.
  
• To assist / promote in the con servation of Natural Environ ment.
  
• To assist those who are present ly engaged in the demining pro gramme.
• To promote and assist in build ing the Civic Conscious Society
  
• To assist and implement pro grammes / projects addressing the immediate / short-term needs vulnerable groups
  

The objectives do seem laudable for the betterment of the ‘communities’. There though needs to be a few additional considerations. These include the takeover militarily to ‘clear’ the area of undesirable elements. It leaves behind the elected political representatives, new alliances such as EPDP, PLOTE, TULF, the two wings of the “K’ group and other rump elements of militant groups and the representatives of the GoSl ministries and departments intervening. Given this collection the security forces have to keep a tight lid, in the absence of which some constituent elements would break the peace or worse. At what point does it become safe to ease the controls. Possibly after all these stakeholders have found their legitimate space and hierarchies found for governance. This is like finding unity in Iraq. This enterprise though has not come online yet.

• Selection and Deployment Process for NGOs / INGOs
  Compliance both regulatory requirements and registration with National/ District/ Divisional Level Authorities.
  
• Providing Institutional Capacity to engage in the chosen sectors/areas of work with funds.
  
• Declaring the identity of stakeholders who would jointly implement the project activities.
  
• Obtaining specific area and subject clearance from the District Secretary/Government Agent/Hon Governor and eventually from the Relevant Line Ministries before implementation of the Projects / programmes.
  
• Avoid overlapping and duplication of activities in order to get maximum benefits for the upliftment of the region.
  

Guidelines for NGOs /INGOs in their Do’s and Don’ts

• Do comply with Registration Do not by-pass any stipulated re quirements
  
• Do obtain Security Clearance Do not collaborate with anti-Govern ment elements
  
• Do submit proposal with past Do not spend time and resources on performance and obtain appro val awareness programmes
  
• Do submit staff details Do not re cruit staff without screening process
  
• Do submit an Action Plan & Pro gress Report. Do not go beyond the approved project proposal
  
• Do declare vehicle particulars Do not engage unauthorized vehicles.
  

Institutional Arrangements for Implementation of Projects and Activities
Village / G N Division Level

Discuss with village Development Committee /Citizens Committee members and elected members of Parliament,Provincial,Municipal and local level and the village level government officials of the project proposal and obtain approval from the Village Development Committee after doing a need Assessment.

Obtain approval of the Divisional Level Committee consisting of Divisional Secretary (Chairman) OIC of Police Station and designated members from the Village Development Committee, designated member of INGO / NGO, should participate at the divisional level meetings.

This Committee will assess the needs of the people in that area before implementation of projects in consultation/ Coordination with the members of Parliament, Provincial, Municipal, local level elected members of the respective area.

• District Level Committee
  This Committee will function as District Level Steering Committee in Coordination with the Hon. Ministers/Members of Parliament, Provincial, Municipal, local Council members of the Area following members will constitute the Committee
  

• GA/District Secretary – Chair man
  
• Member from the Security estab lishment
  
• Representative from the Provin cial Council
  
• Designated representative from INGO/ NGO
  
• Representative from the Minis try of Nation Building & Estate Infrastructure Development
  
• Depending on the nature of the project activities, representa tives will participate from the line Ministries
  

Provincial Level Steering Committee

• Hon Governor of Eastern Province function as Chairman of the Committee coordination with the Hon. Ministers, Member of Parliament, Provincial Council, Local level members of the region. . Chief Secretary. Operation Commander of the Eastern Province. Addl. Secretary – MNB & EID
  
• Mr. Chandra Fernando – Senior Advisor. Two Representatives from INGO / NGO
  
• Role of INGOs / NGOs to obtain Security Clearance from Police / Army
  
• Forward a list of names with their ID numbers who are engaged in development activities to the area security personnel. Forward a supplementary list of names with ID numbers to the security personnel
  
• Provide Vehicle Registration numbers with names of drivers with their ID numbers who are engaged in project activities.
  

Much of what needs to be done in understanding needs, obtaining clearances etc is reasonable. The structure though is unwieldy and is not conducive to efficient work. Neither does it address the past toll from the ravages of the war adequately. The claim to be the master designer and for regional claims on development is another facet for consideration.

From 1977 attempts to accommodate district and regional voices in the governance of the districts and province has been attempted. It includes the Provincial administration and what it represents. Another actor is the intervention of funds and agencies. They need space and sensitive knowledge. The interventions may not go beyond a cautious process of intervention since formal structures of peace are not in place. For them the dilemma is to know what can go wrong and to do nothing. Or to advice in hindsight what may follow if the fundamentals are not in place as referred earlier.

The Northern theatre presents another set of issues in terms of Jaffna and the Vanni regions; a simmering landscape at a minimum ready to explode with fury at any moment. The region has a significant presence of civilians amidst a tense military build up on all sides.The third dimension is related political battles principally between the Government and the Opposition led by the National Congress. In this scenario, those at the helm have a formidable agenda for stewardship while managing war and conflict.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/08/25/opinion/1.asp)

Read Full Post »

LTTE number two a man of many faces

A decade ago, a ship loaded with tens of thousands of mortar bombs left the shores of Mozambique, dropped anchor at Madagascar and vanished. Weeks later, a fax machine at the US embassy in Colombo spat out a piece of paper that announced the vessel had been hijacked, raising alarm and concerns over Sri Lanka’s ability to successfully complete a military offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

It is now widely believed the cargo meant for the Sri Lankan government was actually loaded on an LTTE-owned vessel — one of many run by a shadowy man called Kumaran Padmanathan, or Shanmugam Kumaran Tharmalingam, or Sadasivam Padmanathan, or Periya Dorai, or Kanakapillai, or simply KP as the man with a handful of aliases is known to the world.

The ship landed the mortar bombs off LTTE-held territory in northern Sri Lanka and soon after, the guerrillas rained them on the military, wresting control of the battle for a highway that connects Jaffna to the island’s south. Nearly 10 years later, most of that highway is still under LTTE control.

KP, widely known as the chief arms buyer for the LTTE for decades after setting up a successful smuggling operation in the 1980s, was reported by Sri Lanka’s authorities to have been arrested in Thailand on Monday, raising hopes that the dreaded organisation could now be made to crumble. By Tuesday, the euphoria seemed to be eroding a bit after Thai officials announced they knew nothing about the Sri Lankan claims and India, which has a strong interest in the man due to his role in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, saying it was trying to confirm he had indeed been arrested.

“I’ve checked with related police bureaux — the Immigration Police, Metropolitan Police and Special Branch. There has been no report of a Tiger rebel arrested in Bangkok,” Thailand’s national police spokesman Lieutenant-General Ronnarong Youngyuen said. “If we’d arrested him, we would have made good publicity out of it,” he told Reuters.

The CBI said it was waiting to hear from the Thais. “We have learnt about the reported detention and have requested the government of Thailand through diplomatic channels to confirm the same. We have also contacted Interpol Bangkok. We haven’t got any response till now,” CBI Director Vijay Shanker told reporters on the sidelines of an Interpol Conference on cyber crime in New Delhi.

In Colombo, officials said they believed KP was under detention. A top official, who did not want to be named, said that KP was under heavy surveillance, a term security experts interpreted as a euphemism for sustained and intense questioning.

KP has several aliases and has worn many hats in his efforts to keep the arms pipeline open to the LTTE and bankrolling it — those of a businessman, arms dealer, smuggler and master forger with access to several bank accounts across the world. Sometimes known as an immigration officer’s worst nightmare because of the number of passports he is reported to juggle, KP has stayed ahead of intelligence agencies following him across the world — successfully managing the vast, multinational business empire built by the LTTE.

From high-end explosives like RDX, which the LTTE used to blow up the Central Bank building in 1996 and then the twin tower World Trade Centre in Colombo the next year, and surface-to-air missiles that brought down Sri Lanka Air Force aircraft, every and anything the LTTE needed was bought by KP.

He is reported to have been seen in different places, including Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Cambodia, striking deals with rebels and arms suppliers to ship weapons, explosives and dual-use technologies to help the LTTE keep fighting its war for an independent homeland. Arms bought in Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam are said to loaded on to LTTE ships from southern Thailand, which take them to the group’s jungle stronghold in Sri Lanka. Malaysia and Singapore both have sizeable Tamil populations.

Some reports suggest KP is related to Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE supreme who lives in the jungles of the Wanni in northern Sri Lanka. He is reported to have set up several front companies across Southeast Asia to funnel money and arms to the group and also taken Thai citizenship. After Prabhakaran, he is the second most wanted man in Sri Lanka.

(http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print.aspx?Id=fd672d33-59a3-4e89-9a74
-375b6ac3b707)

Read Full Post »

No feast in the East

Mounting political killings and livelihood bans

With harrowing statistics on abductions and killings reported daily, it is easy to get lost in the numbers. The public is rightfully unnerved by the worsening climate of the war with abductions and killings on the rise last month. However, aside from the violence, more worrying concerns are surfacing affecting the livelihood of ethnically diverse communities as well as farmers and fishermen.

The face of killings has transformed into a politically motivated one, asserts the Foundation of Coexistence (FCE) at their monthly human security roundtable meeting. 27 political killings have taken place in the month of August alone. Ethnic tensions perpetuated by land disputes between Tamils and Muslims reverberate throughout the northeast. As Tamils are stripped of land due to ‘security concerns,’ Muslims are selling land at what Tamils consider to be exorbitantly high prices.

As the country’s political and military situation deteriorates, communities are left to fend for themselves under already dire circumstances. Communities with a history of cultural conflicts are left to resolve contentious issues on their own without mediators helping to mitigate tensions.

According to the FCE President Kumar Rupasingha, “Turbulence in the East remains a major factor and is likely to continue for some time.” He argues north eastern turmoil is heightened because of the government’s failure to consolidate military gains. Mr. Rupasinghe believes the government has made two grave mistakes in the process of dealing with IDPs and the presence of new police who do not speak Tamil. Non-Tamil speaking police in the region have resulted in increased difficulties at check points.

As burgeoning ethnic conflicts and language barriers intensify an already heated region, farmers and fishermen have especially faced a gruelling time. In Trincomalee, the government promised displaced farmers of resettlement by the middle of October while they currently continue to suffer from prohibited cultivation under the ‘security’ umbrella.

According to the FCE, “security forces put up fences. Tamil farmers fear they cannot return to heightened security zones.” Despite growing difficulties in agriculture, fishing in Tricomalee relaxed last month with fishermen being allowed to fish 5 days a week contrary to the 3 days only rule imposed earlier this year. Nevertheless, seven villages are still entirely banned from fishing due to security concerns.

In the Batticaloa district, the security situation is not any rosier. Political killings and abductions steadily increased in August. Abductions during bus travel are more prevalent. Whereas military operations are decreasing, the STF has expanded outside the city. An FCE spokesperson claims that residents of the region “suspect a Sinhala colonisation.”

In light of the worsening security situation, many Batticaloa farmers began negotiating with the Sri Lankan army in hopes of lifting heavy bans implemented prohibiting farmers from entering paddy fields. The SLA granted permission to enter paddy fields under stringent conditions requiring farmers to carry recommendation letters from a committee, which in itself will be difficult to attain. Of the 3,000 acres of arable land, only 1,200 are exempt from agricultural bans.

The Batticaloa fishing ban implemented in December 2006 demolished the livelihood of many fishermen. However, the SLA permitted fishers to fish during the daytime beginning August 1.

In Ampara district, farmers still face mobility restrictions with the STF carrying out house to house searches. Although abductions have gone downward, the public is still largely wary of abductions. The public is afraid to complain to the police in fear of death threats. The FCE explained that in addition to embedded fears, the TMVP attempted to resolve personal issues between Muslims and Tamils in the region, creating even greater tensions.

The FCE declares that “Mannar will be a big place to look at in the near future” because of increased confrontations taking place between the SLA and LTTE in the region. The security system of Mannar continues to deteriorate in the midst of newly introduced restrictions stipulating that NGOs are prohibited from providing services directly to affected areas.

Increased tensions have added different dimensions to an already inundated set of difficulties facing the north eastern areas. Affected areas are trying to come to grips with strengthened agricultural as well as fishing restrictions. While some bans are lifted, new ones quickly take their place making it progressively complicated to secure livelihood.

(http://www.dailymirror.lk/2007/09/12/feat/02.asp)

Read Full Post »

Sea Tigers in Maldivian Custody Facilitated SLN Attack

A GROUP OF LTTE CADRES in Maldivian custody had facilitated this week’s destruction of, what Navy Chief Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda called, three floating armouries over 600 nautical miles south-east of Sri Lanka, in an exclusive naval operation.

“They helped us to identify two of the ‘rogue’ ships. “In fact, they had boarded the floating armouries and knew all about their cargo,” an authoritative military official told The Island. The destruction of the third vessel was a bonus, he said.

The Maldivian Government had given the SLN access to four LTTE cadres captured following a bloody confrontation on their southern territorial waters on May 17 this year. “We are grateful to President Maumoom Abdul Gayoom’s administration for giving access to suspects in their custody.”

The Island exclusively reported about a Colombo-based embassy seeking information about the Sri Krishna but by that time, she had been sunk. This fuelled speculation that there had been an attempt to save Sri Krishna.

The four persons were among the nine-man crew which had commandeered an Indian trawler, the Sri Krishna, allegedly used to transfer military hardware from the floating warehouses. The Sri Krishna was flying the Sri Lankan flag at the time the Maldivian Coast Guard retaliated after she fired at a Maldivian dhoni (fishing craft).

The Maldivian Coast Guard had intercepted the Sri Krishna while she was heading towards Sri Lankan waters with a consignment of armaments, including a sizeable stock of 120 mm mortars. It was sunk near Gaaf Alif waters.

The LTTE had seized the Sri Krishna along with 12 Indians -ten from Kanyakumari and one each from Thoothukudi and Kerala near the Indo-Lanka maritime boundary on March 4. The Maldivian Coast Guard also rescued the Sri Krishna’s skipper Soza who said that his colleagues were taken in Sea Tiger craft to the Vanni mainland. The LTTE secretly ferried them to South India immediately after Soza’s revelation.

LTTE cadres, now in Maldivian custody are believed to have been involved in the massacre of five Indian fishermen off Kanyakumari on March 29th. Although some Tamil Nadu politicians and an influential section of the Chennai-based press blamed the SLN, the ‘Q’ branch of the Indian Police cleared the SLN. The India Police said that six LTTE cadres arrested on April 11 by the Indian Coast Guard off the Tuticorin coast were Sea Tigers deployed to ferry arms.

Their arrests followed the arrest of five – three LTTE operatives and two Indians off Kodikarai on February 13th. India is yet to give access to LTTE cadres in her custody.

Despite compelling evidence of LTTE attacks on Tamil Nadu fishermen and collision between the LTTE and some Indian fishermen, Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony reiterated unsubstantiated accusations against the SLN in May.

SLNS Samudura (formerly US Coast Guard cutter Courageous), SLNS Suranimala (Fast Missile Vessel acquired from Israel), SLNS Sayura (formerly of the Indian Navy), SLNS Shakthi (Landing Ship Tanker acquired from China) had been involved in the operation. The SLN deployed two logistical vessels-520 and 521 to re-fuel the four Offshore Patrol Craft (OPVs) deployed for the mission.

A spokesperson for the Media Centre for National Security asserted that the re-fuelling was a critical part of the operation. “We could not have sustained the operation without the two support vessels,” he said.

(http://www.army.lk/morenews.php?id=7847)

Read Full Post »