Artillery, mines and sniping are the three main components of the LTTE’s defensive war in the north western region. While the LTTE has been reasonably successful in holding the security forces at bay, so far it is indeed a moot point as to whether the Tigers can sustain this effort indefinitelyLast Sunday (February 17) was a sad day for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), since it lost in battle another senior stalwart who had rendered yeoman service to the movement for more than two decades.
Lt. Col Thava, or Thavam as he was called, was not one widely known to the world like Tiger Police Commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan. But in his own quiet way, Thava was responsible for portraying the LTTE in a positive light and projecting the Tiger cause worldwide.
Apart from his combat duties Lt. Col Thava was functioning since 1990 as the chief cinematographer of the LTTE’s Nitharsanam television station.
In recent times he was also the deputy chief of the Tigers’ Film Division. In addition, Thava also doubled up as LTTE Chief Velupillai Prabhakaran’s special photographer on important occasions.
Thava’s forte
Thava’s forte was his fearless videoing on the battlefront. Armed with a camera, Thava waded into the thick of fighting at great risk. He captured on camera the different dimensions of heated battles. As a result of his labour, much of the LTTE’s comparative military history was archived on celluloid.
The battles of Mankulam and Kokkavil in 1990, where the LTTE overran both military camps; the ill-fated Elephant Pass war of 1991; the successful amphibian assault on Pooneryn in 1993 codenamed ‘Operation Thavalai’ or Frog; and several successful phases of ‘Operation Unceasing Waves’ (Oyatha Alaigal) were but some of the historic battles witnessed and recorded by Thava.
The videoing of battles was of great utilitarian value. Apart from being telecast on the Nitharsanam TV, videos were made and circulated worldwide. This was of much propaganda value and was an incentive for the Tamil diaspora to contribute lavishly to the cause.
At another level LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran used to view the raw footage to assess the battlefront situation. It was also used in training camps to motivate new recruits. Also LTTE military strategists used it to do post-mortems on battles fought.
There was a time when the LTTE’s broadcasting service, ‘Voice of Tigers,’ was attached to Nitharsanam as a sub-unit. During this time Thava was involved in broadcasting too in many spheres.
Thava was also involved in making films. He was the cinematographer for the LTTE’s full length feature film, Kaatruveli (The Windy Plains).
Apart from filming, Thava also dabbled in acting. He played the role of Major Kinny in the docu-drama Innoru Naadu (Another Country). He also acted in the short features Muttrugai (Siege) and Viduthalai Moochu (Breath of Liberation).
In recent times Thava was involved in setting up a film archive for the LTTE.
Videoing battles
According to LTTE old-timers, the Tigers were the first among Tamil militant organisations to photograph scenes of battle, etc.
However, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) stole a march over the LTTE when it videoed the successful attack on the Chavakachcheri Police Station in 1984.
The video was circulated worldwide and resulted in many diaspora Tamils donating generously to the TELO after being thrilled by the visuals. An annoyed LTTE then plunged into extensive videoing.
Former LTTE Jaffna Commander Sathasivampillai Krishna Kumar, alias Kittu, was a man fond of new technology and innovations. He set up a special unit under Bharathan, who is now in a Western country.
In those days LTTE Chief Prabhakaran was in Tamil Nadu and his deputies in north eastern Sri Lanka had to report regularly to him.
Kittu hit on the novel idea of sending reports on film to his ‘Thalaiver’ (leader). Prabhakaran, a film buff, was pleased by this. Soon more and more videos of live action were shot and sent to the Tiger Supremo.
Jaffna peninsula assumed conditions of a semi-liberated state from mid-1985 as the security forces were basically confined to barracks.
One interesting development then was the flourishing of a number of small TV stations. These were run by private individuals and telecasts were restricted to specific localities. Subscriptions were solicited from householders.
The LTTE began to distribute their action videos and get them on these TV stations. Gradually the LTTE developed its own TV station known as Nitharsanam. Bharathan was its head.
In 1987 the Indian Army destroyed the Nitharsanam TV tower and made it inoperative. The LTTE resumed Nitharsanam in 1990 after it gained control of the greater part of the Northern Province.
Many of the LTTE battles were shown on Nitharsanam TV. Video magazines titled Nitharsanam were made and sent abroad. The LTTE also made videos for training purposes.
Rise to prominence
It was during this time that Thava began to shine as a field cinematographer. Thava made his mark, rose to prominence in Nitharsanam, and caught the eye of Prabhakaran.
Prabhakaran has also used the capability of Thava and other members of the unit to video-graph security installations and troop movements. This data helped the LTTE Chief to draw up elaborate battle plans.
Thava hailed from Thiriyai in Trincomalee District. The village was virtually destroyed by the security forces in 1984 and most of the people were dispersed. Thava, in his teens, then teamed up with the LTTE. Senior LTTE Leader Pulenthiran sent Thava to Jaffna.
Pandithar, the Tiger Chief in Jaffna, took Thava under his wing and provided him local training. After Pandithar’s death Kittu became Jaffna commander.
Kittu recognised Thava’s talent for photography and encouraged him. Eventually Thava became chief cinematographer for Nitharsanam.
It is said that Thava died in harness at Palamottai in the Vavuniya District.
According to reports, he was conducting a field workshop in combat cinematography for new Tiger recruits on February 17 when an Army shell exploded close by. Lt. Col Thava and Major Pugalmaran were killed.
A joint funeral service was held for both in Kilinochchi. The LTTE’s Kilinochchi zone Political Wing Head Kalaivanan presided. Vavuniya District Military Commander Velavan lit the ceremonial flame. LTTE Political Commissar Nadesan delivered the eulogy.
Thava’s mother lit the flame of sacrifice for Thava while his wife garlanded the body. She too is a Tiger woman cadre and working in the media division. Pugalmaran’s father lit the flame and garlanded his son’s body.
Theatre of conflict
Lt. Col Thava’s death in action focuses attention towards the continuing strife on the north western front. The north west became the theatre of conflict after the LTTE was ejected from the Eastern Province.
The government shifted its attention towards the Mannar District and those parts of Vavuniya District under LTTE control after the fall of the east.
In the first week of September, the armed forces took over the Musali AGA division in the south of Mannar District in a swift military manoeuvre. The Tigers retreated without firing a shot. Thousands of civilians, both Tamil and Muslim, were displaced.
Thereafter, the security forces began intensive shelling of some other areas of Mannar District under LTTE control. Frequent aerial bombardment was also conducted.
More than five months have passed since the capture of Musali division, but the security forces are yet to show significant gain in acquiring real estate from the LTTE in Mannar district since then.
The hyper-active Media Centre for National Security regales us with regular bulletins of significant victories. According to these reports, LTTE cadres are being killed in large numbers each day; Tiger bases and bunkers are being destroyed frequently.
According to some security-sourced reports, more than 2,000 tigers have been killed in Mannar since the beginning of this year while the LTTE casualty figures for Vavuniya district for this year exceeds 1,000 according to the same reports.
Since official Colombo estimates of LTTE strength put it around 10,000 to 15,000, the Tiger casualties for this year alone amount to more than 20% of the total number of Tiger cadres. If correct, this is a very big achievement. But then there are those two words, “If correct.”
We also hear and read many reports about LTTE demoralisation. We are told of mass desertions; we are told of massive defections; suddenly young Tiger cadres are dying with pathetic letters written to their parents in their pockets.
Confusing reports
Another puzzling feature is the regular pattern of official media releases on the ground situation. There are many reports about LTTE positions being overrun and defences destroyed.
There are reports about places being captured and then recaptured and then being re-recaptured. We are not told how this was possible.
The official reports about ground positions are also confusing. One day we are told that the security forces are within a few 100 yards of a particular place. On another day we are informed that security forces are a few kilometres away from the same place.
Likewise, we are informed officially that the LTTE has been dislodged from a particular place; again we are told in another report that heavy fighting took place in the place taken from the LTTE. In a further report, we hear of fighting close to the place where the LTTE was driven away. Only now the Tigers are back again.
Morale is high among security forces on the war front, say official reports. This is certainly true.
Given the overwhelming superiority of the security forces over the Tigers in manpower, firepower, airpower, etc., morale should certainly be high within the security forces. The track record of recent military victories should be a further morale booster.
What is missing in this official narrative is the actual state and condition of the ground situation. If one discards the verbiage and cuts to the chase, one factor is clearly visible.
In spite of more than five months of intensive fighting, the security forces have not made much headway. Only peripheral gains have been made. The official communiqués are more flatulence and less excreta.
It is certainly true that the security forces have not yet launched the long anticipated multi-pronged offensive into Tiger territory. That is still on the cards. But the security forces have been regularly conducting sorties and limited ‘push’ operations on multiple fronts.
Determined defensive
If the unrealistically bloated LTTE casualty figures are taken out of the picture, there is very little advantage to show for all this. The main reason for this situation is the dogged and determined defensive war fought fiercely by the LTTE.
Earlier LTTE defensive preparations saw the Tigers erecting three broad defence rings.
One was around all areas controlled by it; the second was around the north eastern region east of the A9 Highway; the third was around strategic areas in the Mullaitivu District.
Against this backdrop, the north western region to the west of the A9 Highway or Jaffna-Kandy Road was comparatively vulnerable. It was on this premise which the defence authorities based their calculations and launched intensive military activity.
What has happened now seems to be a strategic shift by LTTE Chief Prabhakaran.
Instead of offering limited resistance and then withdrawing as done in the past, the Tiger Supremo seems to be mobilising his resources to fight a full-scale defensive war on the north western front itself.
While Mannar District Commander Letchumanan and Vavuniya District Commander Velavan are in charge of defences, a number of senior Tiger commanders are also in the north western fray.
Bhanu and Sornam, who were both past Mannar District commanders, and Jeyam, the ex-Vavuniya commander, are all involved in the defensive war. They are very familiar with the terrain.
Two other seniors in the field are Charles Anthony Infantry Division Commander Amithab and Ramesh, who is in charge of the Jeyanthan Infantry Division.
Amithab is from Vavuniya District while Ramesh is the former eastern regional special commander who succeeded ‘Col.’ Karuna.
Disadvantages
Two disadvantages suffered by the LTTE were about the motivation and loyalty of some cadres.
The LTTE has conscripted around 12,000 to 15,000 cadres in the past 18 months. Since most of them were abducted against their will, their loyalty and motivation was suspect. In addition, they had no battlefront experience.
The protracted warfare on the north western front has provided an opportunity for the LTTE to try and test the new cadres. They are being rotated in batches and deployed in the many different battle zones.
Slowly and steadily, the new cadres are being ‘blooded’ and by all accounts getting absorbed into regular ranks.
The other problem was the attitude of the eastern cadres. There are about 4,000 eastern cadres in the Wanni right now. Some of them were demoralised due to the Karuna revolt and its consequences.
A related problem was the question of whether some eastern cadres could be trusted because of regional and personal loyalty to Karuna.
Recent developments have brought about an attitudinal change. The co-option of the Karuna faction as a paramilitary outfit of the state has dispelled all illusions about Karuna.
The eastern warlord himself languishes in a British jail. Pillaiyan, described as a “running dog of (Sinhala) imperialism” is in charge now.
Thus, there is no alternative centre of attraction for the eastern cadres. Divided loyalty is becoming a thing of the past. They are being reintegrated into the LTTE and are plunging into battle with clear objectives.
It cannot be forgotten that eastern cadres under Karuna played a decisive role in the ‘Jayasikuru’ and ‘Oyatha Alaigal’ battles in the Wanni.
Closing of ranks
The presence of Ramesh and deployment of the east-raised Jeyanthan Infantry Division demonstrates closing of ranks within the LTTE.
Another development in the situation is the resumption of regular supplies to the LTTE. The success of the Navy and Air Force in destroying some LTTE ships and vessels had caused a serious rupture in procuring military material and supplies. Arms supply had become a trickle. There was a shortage of fuel too.
This situation, according to battlefront reports, is now changing. The LTTE in recent times does not seem to be in short supply. This is reflected in the way the Tigers are now conducting the war. The earlier constraints are diminishing. It is suspected that Tiger supply routes are ‘working out’ again.
The LTTE’s defensive war is fundamentally reliant on three things: Firstly, its artillery; secondly, its landmines; and thirdly, its sniping.
The Kittu Artillery Division is actively engaged in firing shells with precision. A plus point for the LTTE is that many of the shells used are homemade in the LTTE’s indigenous ordnance factories. One of the lethal artillery shells causing much damage is a new one named ‘Ragav.’
The Ponnammaan Mining Unit is also inflicting damage. Ponnammaan, whose real name is Kugan Yogaratnam, is the brother of former LTTE Political Commissar Naren Yogaratnam, alias Yogi.
Ponnammaan was killed in the Kaithady explosion of February 14, 1987. Yogi, who was expelled from the movement, is now back as its head of Military History Division.
New chain mine
The Ponnammaan Unit has been laying mines effectively. An innovation in recent times has been a new form of chain mines. The concealed mines are linked together and form a kind of chain laid out in different formations. When one mine is stepped upon, there is a chain reaction, causing widespread damage.
The third is sniping. It appears that the LTTE has acquired some sophisticated long-range sniper rifles. Well-trained Tiger snipers are now putting them to use, it seems.
Many casualties among security forces are due to sniping. Recently snipers inflicted heavy damage in the Aatkaattyvely area.
Artillery, mines and sniping are the three main components of the LTTE’s defensive war in the north western region.
While the LTTE has been reasonably successful in holding the security forces at bay, so far it is indeed a moot point as to whether the Tigers can sustain this effort indefinitely.
For one thing the security forces are yet to launch a full-fledged, multi-pronged offensive. At one stage the security forces did commence a ‘push’ in 10 different places.
These, however, were essentially ‘limited offensives.’ The decisive moment will be when a concerted operation on a massive scale is launched.
The other point is whether the LTTE can ensure a steady flow of supplies to cadres at the battlefront. Logistics would be a problem if security forces manage to interdict supply routes.
Two targets
Currently the security forces seem to be having two targets. One is Madhu and the other, Adamban. Recent troop movements are conducted with these twin objectives. Madhu is of political significance while Adamban is of military importance.
In trying to take Madhu, the security forces are careful to avoid causing any damage to the famous Our Lady of the Rosary Catholic shrine.
Thus, the forces are trying to encircle the region and make the LTTE vacate the area. This is one reason for the delay in advancing on that front.
Adamban is a strategic area where two key roads intersect. If Adamban falls, the security forces will be able to progress rapidly in different directions.
Adamban is the gateway and this is its importance. If Adamban falls, then the LTTE controlled coastal strip of Vidathaltheevu-Nachikudah will be next.
The ultimate objective will be the securing of the littoral along the Mannar-Pooneryn Road.
By doing so, the artillery bombardment of Jaffna by the LTTE will cease. It can also open up a land-based route to Jaffna via the Sangupiddy-Keratheevu ferry. Oil exploration activity in the Mannar basin will be easy. Also, a ground-based drive towards Elephant Pass is possible.
For all these reasons, the coastal stretch of the Mannar-Pooneryn Road is important. The LTTE knows it too and hence its stiff resistance.
How long can the LTTE hold out in this fierce defensive war on the north western front, is a key question.
Equally important is the question whether the LTTE would be content to continue with this defensive strategy or embark upon some offensive strategy in the near future.
The Eight Man Team 