LRRP: Secret agency swirls in mystery by Iqbal Athas

Located somewhere near the borders of Tiger guerrilla dominated Wanni, it was only known as “Training Headquarters.” That again was by a select few who were associated with it. They knew its significance and importance but kept it a “top secret.”

To others who saw it occasionally from a distance, it looked just another building where troops were billeted. No one raised questions. No one offered to explain either. The area was out of bounds to all but a handful.

In the recent weeks word spread, from ear to ear, in the military hierarchy about this “Training Headquarters.” They were only talking in whispers at the Mess Halls or during one on one chats.

Their attention had been drawn after reports that the Army’s Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs), the prized units that were dreaded by Tiger guerrillas, had been disbanded. It was not so.

I said last week that contrary to such reports, “Some two months ago, Army Commander Lt. Gen. (Shantha) Kottegoda relieved Major General Gamini Hettiaratchi, a highly respected officer with a proven track record, from training any more Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP). Painstakingly he had raised more than 35 such units in the recent past after putting the men through rigorous training.

I added: “The hand picked men were from the Army’s Commando Brigade and Special Forces Brigade. Whether Lt. Gen. Kottegoda took the decision to stop LRRP training on orders from above or on his own is not clear. Those under training were consequently asked to revert to their respective units.”

These comments in The Sunday Times last week came on the very day Sri Lanka Army was marking their 55th anniversary. Last Sunday morning Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Kottegoda, arrived at Army Headquarters in full ceremonial regalia. There was a guard turn out. He was then received there by Major General Sunil Tennekoon, Security Forces Commander, Jaffna. That was in his capacity as Colonel Commandant of the Artillery Regiment. His men were according a guard of honour to their chief.

Thereafter he walked towards the Army Headquarters building to be received by Chief of Staff, Major General Chula Seneviratne. The latter conducted him to a dais in the nearby lawn from where Lt. Gen. Kottegoda addressed troops. Seated in the front rows were members of the clergy whose blessings he received earlier. Later, it was time to partake in Kiribath and sweetmeats with those present. All ranks and representatives of the media were present.

A reporter asked Lt. Gen. Kottegoda whether he had disbanded the LRRPs or stopped training. He responded angrily “I am not mad to do such a thing. Not in my wildest dreams….” He said their existence is very essential and these men were still being trained.

Lt. Gen. Kottegoda was worried his remarks on that occasion, reflected in some media, tended to give the impression that they were part of his address to troops. That would have amounted to an official admission by an Army Commander before all his troops about covert LRRP activity and the targets they accomplish. “I did not tell that to the troops. I have the tape and you can check it out if you want,” he told The Sunday Times. But he insisted what he told reporters at the traditional Kiribath interlude was “absolutely correct.” The LRRPs have not been disbanded and training activity was continuing. “There is no change in this,” he said.

Despite Lt. Gen. Kottegoda’s assertion, the whisper campaign about the “Training Headquarters” had grown louder after last week’s disclosure in The Sunday Times (Situation Report) that training activity had been halted. As word spread, it became clear that this headquarters had been closed down and more questions were now being raised.

What was this “Training Headquarters” and why was it important? It was the nerve centre or the higher command from where all LRRP activities were directed and controlled. As the name “training” implied, it was also the nerve centre from where such activity was carried out. Though this headquarters has been closed down, The Sunday Times will not reveal where it was located. Installed there were computers that contained highly classified information about guerrilla activity, operational records and many other vital data. It was hooked on line to an intelligence agency in Colombo. The staff maintained other records.

This “Training Headquarters” came directly under the charge of Maj. Gen. Hettiaratchi. He located himself there until he was moved out to Anuradhapura as General Officer Commanding the Army’s 21 Division. Thereafter, he was still responsible for this higher command of the LRRPs.

The demise of this “Training Headquarters” came on August 20 this year. It was spelt out very inconspicuously in the middle of a two page list of “FUNCTIONAL CHANGES TO THE ARMY ESTABLISHMENTS AND REDEPLOYMENT – G/OPS/250/GEN (54).” Dated 18th August 2004 and signed by then Director General – General Staff, Major General Parami Kulatunga it was distributed to 12 different Army establishments.

Pointing out that the Army Commander has approved functional changes for establishments and redeployment of troops with effect from August 20, 2004, a one liner from Maj. Gen. Kulatunga simply said “Training HQ at (name withheld) to be suppressed.” That meant the closure of the “Training Headquarters.” This was how Maj. Gen. Hettiaratchi who was charged with the training LRRP groups was relieved of his responsibilities in this regard.

I erred last week in saying that LRRP men who were under training at the time of the closure were asked to revert to their respective units. By the time orders for the closure arrived the last batch had completed their training and had been posted elsewhere like other groups. The correct position is that two Majors and 37 soldiers attached to the “Training Headquarters” have been reverted to various other units or assigned to senior officers. This higher command is no more. Acquisition of additional equipment, for which Government approval was granted, (as referred to in these columns last week) has been put on hold. This is reportedly on the basis that existing equipment is now sufficient.

Any further comments on developments that followed cannot be made. That could endanger national security interests. However, one thing that could be said is that training has been revived and the concept of operating LRRP groups in an hour of need has not been abandoned.

These developments came amidst several events that seriously dented the Army’s image in the public eye. Paradoxical enough, even the senior officer tasked to protect and promote that image could do little. He was also one of the causes.

The number four in the Army’s chain command, Major General Sisira Wijesuriya, was arraigned before the Colombo Chief Magistrate, Kusala Sarojini Wijewardena, by officials of the Permanent Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption. After an investigation into his assets, the Commission has alleged that he could not account for Rs 1.9 million. The Court released him on bail after he pleaded not guilty.

Maj. Gen. Wijesuriya was the Director-General – General Staff (DGGS) in the Army. He was to have gone on retirement on February 2, next year. It was only on October 5, he made a presentation at the last meeting of the National Security Council on the need to procure 98 more Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) for the Army in the next five years. The move was shot down by President Kumaratunga since it would have cost the Government a colossal more than Rs 20 billion. This was revealed exclusively in The Sunday Times (Situation Report) last week.

As is the practice under such situations, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Kottegoda, relieved him of his official responsibilities and attached him to Army Headquarters. Maj. Gen.Susil Chandrapala, until then Commandant of the Sri Lanka Volunteer Force was named to the top slot as the new DGGS. Another top slot, due to fall vacant on October 31 this year is the post of Military Secretary. This is when Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawala retires. Maj. Gen. Udeni Munasinghe, who was promoted to his rank in June, is likely to take this post.

A move to suspend Maj. Gen. Wijesuriya from service, an administrative requirement under such circumstances, was to again reveal the poor state of affairs in the Ministry of Defence. A letter from Lt. Gen. Kottegoda seeking the sanction of the Ministry arrived but there was much confusion. Defence Secretary, Cyril Herath was away in France. Additional Secretary, Sunil Sirisena, who was acting found that in a similar case in the Navy, two officers were continuing to serve though they had been granted bail by Courts. Six months ago, Commander of the Navy (and now Chief of Defence Staff) Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri had written to the Ministry of Defence seeking approval for their suspension. The Ministry had forwarded the letter for an opinion from the Attorney General’s Department but there had been no follow up action.

Last Thursday they hurriedly consulted the Attorney General’s Department and were advised that regulations warranted suspension. Soon a letter was prepared recommending to President Kumaratunga, who is Minister of Defence, that Maj. Gen. Wijesuriya be suspended. A similar recommendation was also made in respect of the two Navy officers. Her response is being awaited tomorrow.

In the case of the Navy, Commodore Sarath Fernando, head of Dental services and Lt. Cmdr. C. Jayawardena were investigated by the CID. They were later produced in Court and bailed out for allegedly accepting gold coins from the now defunct Pramuka Bank. Both have denied the charge. That had come about after depositing in this bank money from the Officers’ Benevolent Fund. This is a non public fund to which contributions are made by officers in the Navy. Commodore Fernando has been the President of this fund.

One of the two Navy officers, now facing suspension, has an added problem. In view of a delay on the part of the Ministry of Defence to respond, he was sent on a training course abroad. This was after he was found eligible. But senior Navy officials had made sure he signed a written undertaking he would repay all costs connected with this course if he was suspended from service.

A second shock for the Army came in the same week when Military Spokesman, Colonel Sumedha Perera, was named the third accused in a case of forgery before the Colombo High Court. He is charged with aiding and abetting forgery. Lt. Gen. Kottegoda has now recommended that he be suspended from service forthwith. Here again the recommendation now awaits President Kumaratunga’s formal approval.

Earlier, when The Sunday Times (May 30 2004) front paged a report headlined “Military Spokesman, ex BASL Secretary face forgery charges over land deal”, Col. Perera was questioned about it by then Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle. He claimed in writing to him though there was a case, he had been told by an official in the Attorney General’s Department that no indictments would be served against him. But that has now turned out to be false.

The matter was allowed to rest there and Army Headquarters did not check then with the Attorney General’s Department. However, soon after indictments were served on him last Wednesday, they were consulted and were advised to recommend immediate suspension. Col. Daya Ratnayake currently Commander of the 232 Brigade (in Valachchenai) is expected to be named as the new Military Spokesman.

In terms of regulations governing the armed forces, officers placed on suspension are not entitled to any facilities including vehicles and escorts. They are also not entitled to pay. All military installations are out of bounds for them.

Just the week before his suspension, Col. Sumedha Perera was at the centre of another controversy at Army Headquarters. This was after Maj. Gen. Sivali Wanigasekera, Commandant, Army Staff College (and Regminental Commander, Gajaba) had met Lt. Gen. Kottegoda with a plaque that was to be placed at the newly built swimming pool of the Gajaba regimental headquarters in Saliyapura, Anuradhapura.

The plaque named a leading businessman, the largest importer of spirits for the manufacture of liquor, for the donation he had made to build the pool. He had donated Rs. 8 million. It had also named Col. Perera, then Centre Commandant in Saliyapura but the plaque had carried his title as “Director Media.” Maj. Gen. Wanigasekera had argued this should be placed not only because Col. Perera was instrumental in obtaining the donation but would also be an encouragement to other officers. But Lt. Gen. Kottegoda had wanted the matter reviewed.

There has also been a spate of other incidents involving middle and junior level officers. Last week Police arrested Major Anuruddha Wijebahu of the 215 Brigade in Mannar for a spate of vehicle robberies and other unlawful acts. As one senior serving officer remarked, there was prompt and harsh punishment when it came to a solider. But in dealing with officers, the bureaucratic machinery has broken down and action was not forthcoming. As a result, it led to morale problems, he pointed out.

These events only demonstrate the urgent need to promptly streamline the country’s defence establishment, from the Ministry of Defence to the armed forces. That should be a task of priority for President Kumarartunga, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-chief to immediately arrest the deteriorating trend and inspire greater public confidence. A delay can mean disaster.

India out? Palaly project not patch up work

A delay in foreign help prompted the Government to decide to go ahead with the rehabilitation of the runway of the Sri Lanka Air Force base in Palaly on its own.

The decision was made by the Cabinet on Wednesday, October 6. This was on a recommendation made by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Before this decision, India was one of the countries that offered help.

As earlier scheduled, an Indian delegation will arrive in Colombo to further discuss help for modernisation of the Palaly airport, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar told The Sunday Times. He said “this offer is still open but we (the Government) want to get it going because we cannot delay it any further.”

He was commenting on last week’s report in these columns about the Government’s decision to go ahead.

The Sunday Times learns that a delegation from the Indian Ministry of Defence will arrive in Colombo next week to discuss many aspects of the proposed Defence Co-operation Agreement with Sri Lanka. One such aspect is the modernisation of the Palaly airport. The main component of this is the rehabilitation of the runway. Its deterioration prompted the need for modernisation.

The offer of Indian help is conditional on a categorical undertaking that the airport is for the exclusive use of the Government of Sri Lanka and India. The key factor in this is the runway. If it is rehabilitated at full cost by the Government using its own funds, the need to give such a guarantee does not arise. The runway can be used by any party with the express approval of the Government. Agreement on this matter has to be arrived at with India before April, next year, the period by which the Government wants to commence work. There is no issue over modernisation work relating to other areas in the airport like terminal buildings and other structures. Expertise and technical know how for such work are also available locally.

It is unlikely the UPFA Government will be in a position provide a guarantee to India that it will not allow all others, except India, the use of the airport. In fact the previous United National Front Government (UNF) that was instrumental in soliciting the Indian offer of help was opposed to such an undertaking. Their position was re-iterated again in New Delhi last week by Leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremasinghe during talks with Indian leaders.

After the report in these columns last week, the Commander of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), Air Marshal Donald Perera, has given what is billed as an “exclusive” interview to the Colombo Correspondent of India’s respected Hindustan Times. Claiming media reports were wrong (only The Sunday Times reported it), the Air Force chief has declared the Government was going “to do some patch up work only” on the Palaly air base runway. “We have no expertise to undertake any major upgradation (sic)..,” he was quoted as saying. But his Commander-in-Chief, President Kumaratunga, does not think so. Her Cabinet Memorandum speaks about the use of local expertise and the need to use them further. So who is right?

This news report placed some Colombo based Correspondents for Indian media in a spin. One representing a leading news agency, who reported the original The Sunday Times story, was called upon by his head office in New Delhi to explain why he filed a wrong report. He hit back that the Air Force Chief of Sri Lanka was ignorant of a decision made at the highest levels, the Cabinet. He said he had confirmation from the Government. The Indian news agency man knew whom to ask and got it right. If Air Marshal Perera’s claim is correct, that “patch up work” is at a cost of Rs 360 million, (exactly Rs 356,945,800 without VAT). So much of money being used for “patch up work” when there is “a lack of expertise?” He is wrong and is blissfully unaware of the factual position.

It is not clear whether this “exclusive” interview was granted by the Air Force Commander after prior clearance from the Ministry of Defence. This is the practice in every country including India. Without such permission, service chiefs in Sri Lanka have remained debarred from granting interviews to the foreign media. If he did obtain approval, Air Marshal Perera would have certainly been better informed. Such clearance is granted on the basis of the subject matter on which the interview is sought. More importantly he would have avoided colossal embarrassment to President Kumaratunga, her Government, to the country, to himself and to the Air Force he commands. How much more hilarious or tragic can things become?

As Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Donald Perera, the “exclusive” interview reveals, is unaware that his own Commander-in-Chief, his own Minister of Defence and the President sought Cabinet approval not for “patch up work.” She told her Ministers last week “the runway needs to be completely rehabilitated and resurfaced to restore it back to its original condition.” To do so, she recommended the services of local state agencies for consultation and construction work. How could this happen if as Air Marshal Perera claims “they lacked expertise?”

Whilst the Indian offer is “still open,” Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who is pursuing the proposed Defence Co-operation Agreement with India, makes clear the Government cannot “delay any longer.” And President Kumaratunga’s Cabinet Memorandum that was approved by her Ministers sets out the correct facts, some of which are based on what Air Marshal Donald Perera, had brought to her attention earlier on. Here is what President Kumaratunga told her Ministers:

CABINET MEMORANDUM

Rehabilitation of the Runway at Sri Lanka Air Force Palaly

1. The runway of the Palaly airport is 2300m long 75m wide. The effective width for resurfacing is 50m. The runway at Palaly airport has been extensively used since the commencement of hostilities in the North and served to be the lifeline to the North over the years. During occupation of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), heavier aircrafts such as IL76 used this runway and Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) too has been using this runway extensively and has resulted in it being deteriorated to a great extent making it unsafe to landing of aircrafts.

2. Over the years, the SLAF maintained the runway utilizing the resources available. But with the induction of heavier aircrafts such as the C-130, the runway needs to be completely rehabilitated and resurfaced to restore it back to its original condition.

3. It is observed that many of the aircrafts operating in and out Palaly are experiencing cracks on vital components, which are both expensive to replace, and poses a flight safety hazard. Analysis of these cracks over a period of time has clearly revealed that they have occurred due to the deteriorated runway conditions at Palaly. Further the unscheduled “Grounding” of aircrafts, which occur due to the runway condition, hampers the smooth air transport operations of the SLAF and costs a large amount of money for the rectification. Therefore, it is essential that this runway is repaired to ensure continuous air operations to the North.

4. Preliminary investigations were carried out by the Research & Development Division (R&DD) of Road Development Authority (RDA) for re-surfacing of the existing runway and its shoulders. Based on the investigations made, RDA has recommended to improve the surface condition of the runway and the underlying surface to ensure prolonged use.

5. On a directive given by me to the Ministry of Defence, M/s Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau (CECB) which is a government owned institute has been nominated as the Consultant and Contractor for this project.

6. The improvements to be carried out to the runway has been studied by a team of Engineers from CECB, who have recommended three alternative methods of construction as appended below while the total cost estimates (TCE) for all three methods are shown in Annex ‘A’.

(a) Alternative 1 – Laying of 75mm minimum overlay and use Aggregate Base Course (ABC) for correction layers.

(b) Alternative 2 – Adoption of alternative 1 with 100m thick Bitumen Bound Base (BBB)

(c) Alternative 3 – Construction of all three laying using Bitumen Bound Base (Correction Layer, base course, surfacing)

7. The Commander of the Air Force and SLAF’s Civil Engineers analyzed the three (3) alternatives and accepted the Alternative proposal 1, which consists of underlying layer, correction layer and minimum of 75mm asphalt overlay. Due to financial constraints it was decided to withhold the construction of drains which will reduce the total cost by Rs. 51 million.

8. CECB has requested to make available the abandoned Cement Corporation quarry site at KKS for extraction of limestone.

9. CECB’s mobilization period to commence this project is six (6) months and the construction period is twelve (12) months.

10. Since CECB has agreed to expedite the project without keeping a profit margin the cost involved for the alternative proposal ‘1’ will be Rs. 360 million without 15% VAT as indicated at Annex ‘B’.

11. I agree with the recommendations made by the Commander of the Air Force to accept Alternative 1 and hence approval of the Cabinet of Ministers is sought to –

(a) award the Consultation and Construction of the Runway Project at Palaly to CECB at a total cost of Rs. 360 million without 15% VAT.

(b) incur the expenditure by the SLAF with regard to transportation of men, materials and machinery from Colombo to Palaly air base and back to Colombo on the completion of project by the CECB.

(c) treasury to provide required funds of Rs. 360 million for the implementation of this project and actual cost incurred for the transportation.

(d) to utilize the Cement Corporation quarry site at KKS for extraction of limestone.

(e) the project management to be carried out by a team of CECB Engineers and SLAF Civil Engineers throughout the work process.

(f) to pay 20% of mobilization advance to the Contractor, M/s CECB.

(g) payments for the contact to be made on measure and pay basis.

(h) exemption of 15% of VAT by the Treasury.

Sgd: Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga

President and Minister of Defence

Air Marshal Perera has also denied any US offer of help. Although the US has not come up with a firm proposal, The Sunday Times has learnt from authoritative sources that informal offers of help were indeed made. It was, however, not pursued. Here again, he seems ignorant.

Homeguards freed in ‘prisoner swap’ by Sinniha Gurunathan and A.T.M. Gunanada

The long-awaited prisoner swap between the Government and the Tiger guerillas — the release of two homeguards in return for ten guerillas in remand custody — took place in Trincomalee yesterday.

The LTTE handed over the two homeguards, Sarath Bandara and Chandada Piyasiri, to Trincomalee-based SLMM monitors. The duo had been in custody for 68 days. Later, the SLMM who escorted them out of Sampur formally produced them before Minister Maithripala Sirisena, Presidential Secretary W. J. S. Karunaratne and Public Security Ministry Secretary Tilak Ranaviraja at the Navy House in the Dockyard in Trincomalee. From there, the homeguards spoke to President Chandrika Kumaratunga on the telephone.

Coinciding with their freedom, ten LTTE cadres from the Batticaloa jail were released. They had been remanded for various criminal offences coming under the Offensive Weapons Act. The ten were released on cash bail last Thursday. In a tit-for-tat move, the Tigers say they had also imposed what they called a cash bail on the homeguards.

A guerrilla ‘court’ imposed a Rs. 100,000 bail on each of them, but eventually the LTTE informed them that on humanitarian grounds the payment would not be required. They also wanted a person living in the LTTE-controlled area to sign as surety, but since nobody came forward, LTTE’s Trincoamalee district political leader Elilan signed.

They were also told to appear at the Sampur police station on November 26, but later Elilan informed them it would not be necessary to appear in courts. The two homeguards and their families were later taken to the location where their relatives and members of the North East Sinhala Association were waiting.

Hours before the release, Elilan had come to the site where the relatives of the homeguards and members of the NESA had been carrying on a protest and assured them of the release.

He told them that since a Batticaloa court on Thursday had released ten LTTE cadres on cash bail, the LTTE would do the same for the homeguards. But he added that the LTTE was willing to pay the cash bail if the homeguards’ families did not have the money.

Elilan told the relatives that the LTTE had been trying to work out a compromise for the release of the homeguards since they were taken in on August 10, but the government had not agreed.

Elilan invited the relatives and members of the NESA to accompany him to where the homeguards were being held but they wanted an assurance from the SLMM.

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission which was widely criticised for being unable to exert pressure on the LTTE said yesterday that it had displayed its toughest stand with the LTTE on this matter.

SLMM Deputy Chief Hagrup Haukland told The Sunday Times that the formal communication sent by the SLMM to the LTTE Theoretician Anton Balasingham was a final warning and was ‘strongly worded’.

“We are not happy with the way the LTTE is doing things. We have been stern in our communication and informed the LTTE that we wanted an immediate response. Yesterday we had a pledge made by the LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan that the home guards would be released at the earliest,” the SLMM Deputy Head said.

“We have sent a strong worded letter to them. It is clear that they have gone back on their word. We expect an immediate response from them and we have told them so,” he added.

Time for a post ISGA strategy by Jayantha Pitivahala

In an interview, Sri Lankan CEO of a multinational organisation attributed a number of characteristics as essential criteria for the success of organisations such as the one he is engaged in, and said ‘You have to be like Velupillai Prabhakaran’.

The Sri Lankan government is blamed for its inability to gain from the split between Karuna and Prabhakaran. Particularly, its failure to respond to Prabhakaran’s swift movements preventing Karuna from establishing his dominance in the east.

Recent UTHR report also referred to this matter. The truth is that the LTTE (V) activated its cadres so fast that the government and military had to let it go while being engaged in inconclusive procedural consultations and also in the fear that the LTTE will strike elsewhere, jeopardising possible future talks.

Karuna himself was baffled that Vanni knew his terrain better than him.

The bottom line is that taking a courageous decision such as establishing Karuna in the east whether it will backfire or not, is no longer practicable despite the massive presence of three State security forces in Sri Lanka.

The LTTE could do this tomorrow and the government will do nothing but be passive as the hierarchy of authority, chains of communication and political implications are far too complex in the South. The CFA continues with no additions or deletions to its clauses. The Norwegians are back. The JVP is signaling that they are opposed to the Norwegian involvement and ISGA. The LTTE said exactly the opposite. The government is once again helpless. What is inevitable is happening.

The LTTE’s parade moves on uninterrupted. The attempts of the past PA and UNF governments to break its drive towards its goal have ended in a muddle. Short-term, ad hoc approaches were not adequate to tame the LTTE. New political parties in Sri Lanka are unripe and cannot understand the present LTTE and its military and multinational dimensions that we see, being away from Sri Lanka. It is ignorance of one party representative to express the view that if the LTTE is not willing to come in line, the subject will be handed over to the three forces. Haven’t they done that on several occasions before, including the proclamation of a head of state in the 1980s to eliminate terrorism in the north in three months?

It is time they saw the veracity of the situation. Political tactics to capitalise on errors of others is no longer of interest to the public and the country. One party member said something optimistic in a debate. ‘We need to reorganise the entire system’. Interesting indeed, but he needs to elaborate how. Charity begins at home. We read a news item that prison authorities in Sri Lanka are building a magistrate court inside the Colombo prison premises as a remedial measure in response to the series of underworld killings of key witnesses in court cases.

Authorities have in other words officially accepted the inability to apprehend the underworld killers. Taking on the giant LTTE should be then`85 what?

To those who know the LTTE well, it is imprudent on the part of Prabhakaran to settle for anything less. The LTTE cadres who ambushed the Army wearing half sarongs and worn out rubber slippers with locally made explosives and galkatas years ago, are now marching in ceremonial uniforms offering the guard of honour to the national leader of the Tamils. Pallai defence and the airport raid have shown the South their muscle. Several shiploads of sophisticated weapons have been cleared by them from their own ships afterwards with no additional payments to commission agents in between. Some time ago they had an exhibition displaying the weapons captured from the Army. We too saw that on Tamilnet. LTTE has almost completed setting up institutions necessary for self-administration in areas held by them and these institutions are functioning far more efficiently than the government.

LTTE Police Chief Nadesan said ‘there is no corruption, mismanagement or bribery in our system’. Naturally there are no unresolved cases, law delays, red tape, underworld operators, bribery, traffic offenders or sex perverts in LTTE-held areas. True enough, the LTTE does this at gun-point. But this is a society that the underprivileged people in Sri Lanka were dreaming of since Independence. If Prabhakaran hadn’t killed innocent civilians in the south he would have been a model administrator for the whole country. Provided the south converts the gun-point culture to impartial implementation of existing laws.

The UNF government did what it was forced to do.

They took over at a time the state of affairs with the LTTE was at low ebb.

Before the formation of the UNF government, the international media had ‘praised the LTTE for its dazzling attack’ on the international airport as there were no civilian casualties compared to previous bomb attacks. Several Army camps and detachments had fallen and the forces had to donate most of their weapons to the LTTE. In spite of the assurance given by the Sri Lankan military leaders, ground forces were not ready for war again. When a detachment was attacked by the LTTE women cadres in the east, the inmates simply abandoned the camp leaving behind the weapons. This was before the Athurugiriya fiasco. At least the troops have become sensible not to stick their neck out and be called MIA.

So the LTTE was in a position of strength. The prospects for talks were open only on the LTTE’s terms. Appeasement was a way out for the government negotiators until such time, theoretically though, they could re-establish the apparatuses to meet LTTE challenges while kick starting the economy. The former was well in progress and the latter became a non-starter except for the efforts of the Sri Lankan private sector like the apparel and leisure industry giving a slight push to the ailing economy.

The UNF failed to take full advantage of the relatively peaceful two-year period. There were no Premadasa style go-getters in their party. Apart from political bungling, dependence of the UNF politicians on bureaucracy was far too heavy.

Regaining the position of strength if at all is probable with strategic, rational and honest thinkers in politics, bureaucracy and the military. Sri Lanka had a few such in these sectors and they have left the playground. The international community knows the basic weaknesses of Sri Lankan governments and so do the Norwegians. They know which party has the competitive advantage that will determine the outcome of the conflict. UNF, just as the PA ignored the need for overall organisation. The two-year period was good enough to illustrate sincerity for right and futuristic governance, indications of which would have passed on to the masses who would have then protected them at the elections.

The LTTE also smelt the rat when the UNF was trying to institute an international safety net as a short-term device. At the same time the process came to a point that the LTTE had nothing more to gain through negotiations.

The PA, before that, did no better except for allowing the war to become a lucrative business for cronies and being forced at the end to offer a cease-fire in a state of desperation after the airport attack. The LTTE’s repeated warnings against the air strikes were ignored as if the LTTE was frantically on the run for cover.

How the LTTE conducted itself demonstrating her operational strength while taking everyone for a ride politically is known.

After a period of honeymoon, during which they observe the precept ‘leave us alone and we will do the same’, they send the leader’s message. Demand for Eelam, and this time it came in writing. Thus the LTTE’s target from their leader’s vision remains unchanged. Only the devices will vary in their approaches with successive governments depending on situations and opportunities.

Authorities in the government, on the other hand, have not believed in fundamentals and basics. Basics that the LTTE in its own way secured from the day the movement was established.

Time and again it has been seen that numbers could not confront the LTTE as effectively as quality, right direction and long term planning could. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the problem, exploring these basic issues and finding long term remedies do not seem to be under contemplation in the present system in Sri Lanka.

Prabhakaran had one Mission. The Sri Lankan governments had several. Building a well trained, ruthless and powerful force through which ‘the demands’ of the Tamils can be effectively conveyed to the governments and then to establish mono ethnic Eelam was his one and only Mission. Government Missions shifted from ‘killing the Tamils in the early 80s’, ‘crushing the terrorists in the late 80s’, ‘war for peace in the 90s’, ‘negotiated settlement in 2000’ and afterwards ‘appeasement at any cost’. The LTTE leader has come a long way, not only becoming the ‘national leader of the Tamils’ but also a successful chairman of a financially powerful international organisation. Analysts say that there was no magic to his success story. He only practiced what the leadership and management trainers preach in universities and business institutes and the state also offered him a smooth sail due to the malfunctions of the government and security machinery. Training, productivity, profitability, leadership, motivation, performance and even ruthlessness and deception to their highest degree that most companies practice in competition, hostile takeovers etc. are the pillars that are holding the LTTE undefeated. We learn management through theories from Max Webber to Peter Drucker and Prabhakaran learned all that through trial and error and sheer practice. Pragmatism is his religion and commitment is what brought him the title of the most successful and ruthless terrorist leader in the world. The Pallai operation was planned by the military and Prabhakaran defended that successfully. The airport raid was meticulously calculated over for a period of 2 years. He could now fight a conventional warfare without an effort. Black tigers are only a bonus to the organisation. There is more, but I have made the point.

Seeking international community support with repeated utterances back at home to the local galleries that the government will never allow the country to be divided, is a folk tale. The country is physically divided already. The SLMM, the Scandinavian monitoring mission was the eyewitness for demarcation of territories. All Prabhakaran needs is a mechanism to deal with the international community direct. This will also materialise with the advocacy of the tilting international opinion. It is a matter of time. It is also wrong to say that the Tamils abroad are being brainwashed or duped on the pretext that funds collected are for humanitarian work. There is no need for brainwashing. We being expatriates know this well. Prabhakaran has performed. Shown ROI in business terms. People have changed the Sri Lankan leadership several times with no ROI within a foreseeable future. Among the capital invested in LTTE was a considerable ‘ resource’ of Tamil youth now in their war graves. So there is no back- or side-tracking for Prabhakaran now

Recruitment of children as soldiers is a crime. We agree. Denunciations have come from many quarters including international entities. Another view, however ironic to the recent UTHR report, is that most Tamil parents in the north and east will silently bear the fact that it is perhaps better for them to be trained as fighters and have their meal on time than become unwanted, frustrated, hungry and drifting youth depending on parents’ pensions without a future. That would have been their fate even without the war considering the rate of growth of the country over the last few decades as well as the cast minded discriminating society that existed in the North and East. (I have excluded the children who are in slavery as ‘domestic servants’ at mansions in the South). All otherwise they have is a couple of statements issued by Olara Otunu that have not translated into real action in a language that LTTE will understand.

LTTE will in any event take anyone by surprise with the release all the juvenile cadres just before or at the time of realising the ISGA. By then a good part of them who are now given special training will be above the required age limit. The rest will be in their ‘junior cadet list’. A simple formulae taking care of the issue as well as the image.

International community has clearly expressed that funding will turn up only if the peace process continues. They need not say on whose terms. Why should they when the parliamentarians repeatedly announce that this is an internal problem? Countries including the ones that have banned them are willing to establish channels of communication towards what is called rehabilitation and development of North and East. Delegations after delegations have gone to Vanni and have had dialogues with the LTTE without a word on LTTE’s truce violations. Why blame the peace envoy Solheim for that. This is the current trend with the International community in the west. Looking for a slot in promising greener pastures in Asian countries. The listing of LTTE as terrorists will soon be a few lines on their state documents while informal recognition is gradually but surely surfacing. Listing does not mean acting. LTTE may be now regretting the omission of the word Eelam in the ISGA proposals at a time their next delegation is packing up to board the plane to Europe.

Americans have stated their position. ‘Negotiate and settle the problem’. They have too much on their plate with terrorism and now with the abuse of POWs. This position wouldn’t change even if Democrats take over. Unlike Al Quaeda, diaspora support to the LTTE is far too wider. I need not elaborate that to you. Then Sri Lanka wants India to play a role. India has requested major parties to join hands for them to play a role. Tomorrow they will have something else to say. Obviously India is not going to provide seaplanes for Balasingham’s travel nor will Congress go after Prabakaran against the tide of southern politics. Suffice to mention the recent comment of the new Indian Foreign Minister on the extradition of Prabakaran which, according to him, is not their priority at the moment. Indian bureaucracy has however made their people rest assured with its own plan to curtail any future threat to India (not Sri Lanka) emerging from the ISGA – with a simple destabilising policy for the North and East of Sri Lanka. But this will not have a direct positive bearing for a political or economic relief to the South (except for what is explicitly offered by India through bilateral arrangements and whatever benefits accrued from the FTA). Sri Lanka has never been futuristic as India.

All LTTE failures had been lessons that taught them how to succeed. The Governments too had occasional successes but more failures. The difference is that those who were responsible for failures are still around. Some were rewarded down the line. This is not tolerated in LTTE’s style of management. The commanders as well as other non-military leaders under Prabakaran have literally earned their positions. The Military officers resentment to LTTE’s use of self-styled titles by cadres has no positive implication or meaning when LTTE has secured a large part of the island and kept stand-by a massive conventional force ready to onslaught.

This is how the Monitoring Mission views this. Evaluating people and institutions on performance has been a cardinal rule for LTTE. Not for the Government. The present accepted norm that performance is not considered as a factor anywhere in the Government due to politicization or whatever, is well reflected in the economy. It is in fact unfair to expect the LTTE to enter a system which is also corrupt, malfunctioning and on the verge of coming to a complete standstill. But if the performance is not considered as the most vital principle in the overall approach towards dealing with LTTE, Administrators would rather give up now before facing more humiliation in the near future.

While this being the status quo, Sri Lanka’s valuable human resources that had the capacity to work with the Government in all sectors got off the convoy and watched it move slowly without steadily and a destination. Brave youth, who were unfortunately half trained and left unattended in bunkers, laid down their precious life mostly for politicised military blunders. LTTE has no fear of the remaining effective players as they are way ahead in their corporate plan. Balraja’s next move for the HSZ will be a ‘salami take over’ with the help of civilians while Thamilselvam has come of age in international affairs. Most of our opinion makers, both rational and patriotic, with due respect for their concerns, are wasting time.

Defense pact with India will not prevent Pottu Amman from infesting Colombo with suicide cadres nor can the country kick the 4.5 b dollars package away calling it a ransom at a time the Government does not have funds to repair a culvert or a discarded CTB bus. Neither the politicians nor people understand the patriots anymore. It also goes for those expatriates like you who were prepared to work with the Governments out side Sri Lanka. Many of them are no longer accessible. The only link they have with Sri Lanka is once a year visit to show their children the places of interest and to take a break from the rush world. They will soon have other attractive places to visit while the pro LTTE Sri Lankans abroad are multiplying the support to their movement and buying properties in Colombo and suburbs, some of which are operative safe houses for black tigers.

While calling the conflict as Sri Lanka’s internal problem, Sri Lanka acts as if it is too late now to go by the notion that the solution is to be found within themselves even if it is long term. If LTTE is adamant to stay on with their demands, rational thinker will say that despite our present feeble state of affairs the country should start gearing itself at least to an extent where an opportunity will be created for the next generation to deal with the LTTE with a position of strength. All they need is to take measures to produce effective and efficient individuals and institutions. This is the only justice for the country. Country’s fundamentals were in disarray for a long time.

Neither PA nor UNF made attempts to correct them because such measures have to be made for long-term benefits. Vision of the politicians is survival until the year ends. If they start setting examples as against their discourses, our people in Sri Lanka, not the affluent of the elite, will always tighten the belts for the future. This does not mean absolute preparation for war. It means achieving position of strength which everyone knows, is a deterrent factor in a war tensed environment and a ‘competitive edge’ when entering negotiations.

LTTE on the other hand has done an exceptional job with their establishments and human resources. From effective management of funds within the movement, excellent communication, recognising performance, remembering those who were killed in operations, looking after their kith and kin to keeping a close brotherhood relationship with its cadres in all fronts, they are way above the standard of the Sri Lankan Governments. The recent episodes in the parliament were so entertaining and LTTE would have had fun watching the show of our lawmakers. It was all ‘amusing’ but these events make LTTE’s life easier in convincing the international community ( donor countries are already convinced) that a genuine and lasting solution to the ‘ so called Tamil problem’ cannot possibly come from the politicians of this class.

Prabakaran has to honour his undertaking to the Tamils both in Sri Lanka and abroad. They have funded the war for years and Prabakaran is not going to let them down. He too is running out time. Age is catching up for him as well as Pottu, Balraj, Soosai and others who will not have the same dynamism in the battle front in years to come.

The next runners haven’t had much real life combat training. So the march towards his goal needs to be accelerated. The consignments of weapons acquired by the LTTE during the ceasefire are well in place. These were shipments that would have reached LTTE whether UNF negotiators took them up at the negotiating table or not. After all, the Navy succeeded sinking couple of their ships and LTTE stomached this. One year later the same Navy allowed LTTE gunboats to enter Kadiraveli.

Expressed or implied directions and guidelines of the CFA can no longer be exercised. Sornam and Banu, able lieutenants of Prabakaran with proven track records are reorganising the East, this time with better military apparatuses. That is LTTE’s way of moving ahead. LTTE is a serious organisation which, apart from successful leadership and management also believes in ruthlessness as a language understood by people in that part of the world. Bearing in mind that it is the ceasefire assured by the LTTE that has relived the country for politicians to emphasis so much on economic growth, LTTE has become a force that will determine the stability of the country. Tomorrow they will be the trend-setters in Sri Lanka’s other social and cultural spheres too. LTTE is now at the juncture to say ‘give us the ISGA or we will take it’.

Representatives of the International community has a duty. They have their countries to represent. Sri Lanka does not pay their salaries. Norwegians have seen a full cycle of activities. They, as well as donors and others know well the standard of politics and bureaucracy in Sri Lanka. Norwegians are continuously accused of being partial and pro LTTE etc. This is incorrect. Norwegians have only seen the reality and who is winning at the end. We all individually or in groups tend to be with the winners. That is the nature with human beings, organisations or even governments, particularly the west. It is pointless therefore to criticise the Norwegians or the EU before weeding out the non-performers and white elephants in the Government, as none of these foreigners are responsible for the security of the country or guarding the airport. We, expatriates are aware that Norwegians were holding the LTTE so far from making a few more thundering blows that would have brought the country, under whichever Government, to its knees. If that happened Sri Lanka would have opted to offer them Eelam much earlier to save whatever remaining in the South.

The way the country is moving particularly after what we saw yesterday in the Sri Lankan national assembly, LTTE’s achievement is assured from medium to short term now. Isn’t it therefore time to look at a consequential futuristic plan which does not seem to have crossed any Sri Lankan minds yet.

This will call for going back to fundamentals in management and drawing up a plan as to how the houses can be put in order for results in the long run. That is to organise effective and efficient sectors in the south that would also have the capacity to deal with the LTTE in all fronts in the event LTTE continues with its dictatorship. Such a plan should invariably have a justification to the international community that country needs to be re-united in the name of democracy. This is a better and practical position than try to capitalise on the Oslo declaration. In fairness to the LTTE, certainly not for their atrocities against innocent civilians and more recently the intelligence officers, they insisted on the ISGA before the talks with the UNF commenced. UNF tricked them into the committees without having the know-how to activate them.

The dead committees for whatever reasons invalidated the Oslo declaration. But Democracy, no one can question. The country however badly needs the USD 4.5 billion now to look after the mammoth bunch of unproductive people in the government, provincial councils, commission agents, brokers including henchmen and the grand oldies (who wouldn’t let their subordinates grow), the country cannot live without. Prabakaran is a fine pistol shooter himself without a formal training and Nadesan was only a police sergeant before being hand picked to lead the LTTE Police. The ISGA is therefore becoming a reality for LTTE while the South is just above the water struggling to survive.

But in the consideration of a long-term plan, having the right people in the right place does not cost the Government a cent. Evaluation on performance is not difficult. Ideas will come from all quarters free of charge that are presently blocked by advisors and officials half way. Equality and justice to society are not concepts that are difficult to understand and implement. Expatriates will volunteer in expertise and funds. All these may take a while. But the country will be in a position to confront the LTTE and talk what is right and wrong.

Young, educated and decent politicians, without involving their parties can get together and initiate modelling of the future so that it will not be a complicated task for a united effort whenever they hold responsible portfolios in the future. If LTTE disarms its cadres and embraces democracy after securing the ISGA, let this plan also have a provision to learn from the LTTE – from politics to management, as ISGA will soon be a flourishing state within Sri Lanka. (Vast land, hard working people and discipline are sufficient factors for Japanese to invest). To do that, one needs to take a hard look at the LTTE. Find out how they did it. Use the same fundamentals to strengthen the sectors in the Government. They need not execute the non-performers like LTTE does. They can sack them. Army does not need to recruit child soldiers. The present exodus will stop leaving a sufficient number within.

Country needs politicians who practice their discourses. They also need implements to overcome public service lethargy arising from the usual excuse of rules and procedures which have not in any event produced effective decision making, (be it a political or a Government tender), that are sensible, transparent or for the best interest of the country.

It is only a Government which has a position of strength that can fight or negotiate with a separatists movement such as the LTTE. Sri Lanka has one hope now. That LTTE will not accept democracy even after securing the ISGA. That will be the only cause for the struggle against LTTE in the future. Sri Lanka’s present polity and bureaucracy will not support this. They will continue to seek quick fixes as organising the basics will take years. Until then all the present attempts to drag the process and hold the ISGA will fail.

LTTE is getting impatient. When the LTTE secedes with unilateral declaration of ISGA, most of the politicians, negotiators, advisors and other pundits will be out of this country with their families. The remaining politicians will hopefully have common sense, commitment, can live by examples, and show right ways of governance. The young politicians from all parties in the south could be the force to organise the post ISGA strategy. If they take the initiative now, some day with a single Government in the south, they could do the trick. After all, a period of 2 decades has gone down the drain and waiting for another 10 years can be taken as granted by the innocent people of Sri Lanka. Until then the price for the ‘sins committed’ is quite heavy. – That is the ISGA.

A paper presented by Dr Sarath Pitivahala, A retired Economist in Glasgow, to an audience of Sri Lankan professional expatriates in the UK on 9 June 2004. pitivahala@hotmail.com

Book review by Godwin Fernando

War or Peace in Sri Lanka – (International Edition) – Author- T. D. S. A. Dissanayaka

I clearly recollect a statement of optimism, but also of naivety when J. R. Jayewardene addressed Rotarians at a dinner at the Galadari Hotel shortly after he ceased to be the President of our country after a 12 year stint. – “Terrorism cannot go on forever. Terrorists will run out of their resources sooner than later. We may not have been very successful in the battle field, both guerilla and conventional. But we are more successful in thwarting their fund raising abroad and curbing the inflow of arms and ammunition. We will not have to wait for that long for this era of terrorism in our country to be confined into political history.”

Despite my deep involvement at the analytical level on the ethnic conflict, the words of JRJ made me feel optimistic. Hope springs eternal in the human breast and JRJ kindled in me that deep down expectation and yearning of peace. After all, was he not a man of over 50 years political experience and 12 years as Head of State familiar with the cross-currents of ethnicity and its attendant ramifications on the power levers of the body-politic? The words I heard, I thought, cannot be dismissed lightly. I felt happy.

That JRJ somber articulation was in 1990. Almost 15 years have rolled by and at least in hindsight we are poorer but wiser. Even that man of immense political acumen got it all wrong.

On the other hand my classmate at the University of Ceylon and at 39 years of age an Ambassador had the audacity to question the all powerful President J. R. Jayewardene on many a decision on ethnicity and governance. That was T. D. S. A. Dissanayaka, known as ‘Jungle’ to his friends. He certainly was not a pliant Ambassador of the President. He raised many a thorny issue with his boss the President, on matters of ethnicity and Constitution, and the removing of civic rights of Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike and others through the thoroughly obnoxious retroactive legislation. As a professional diplomat who had also served the UN, he did not have to dilute the expressions of his views. Perhaps President JRJ knew that the analyzed political judgments of his young Ambassador had depth and vision. Probably that was the reason why he did not sack this youthful Ambassador whom JRJ, and many others may have considered as a diplomatic upstart. But JRJ was a political animal and everything that he did was subject to the perpetuation of his political power. He did not have any compunction to reject the advise of his young Ambassador who worked directly under him while being a Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after completing four years as Ambassador to Indonesia.

Tremendous knowledge

From the vantage point of being an Ambassador for a 15 year period, meeting Heads of State, Foreign Ministers and other key players in the international arena who had not only expressed deep concern but tremendous knowledge, ‘Jungle’ acquired a vast corpus of knowledge on the political issues and problems that were intrinsic and fundamental to the very stability and prosperity of the nation. These he distilled into the many books on ethnics and politics he wrote, 14 in all during the last three decades. His distinction as an authority on the historicity of ethnicity as well as a specialist on the current political and military issues has been recognized by an international book publisher, Popular Prakashan of Bombay, India. At their request ‘Jungle’ refined and condensed his six books on the ethnic problem into a single international edition that was launched at the International Book Fair at the BMICH this week. It will also be launched at the Frankfurt Book Fair in October this year.

I studied with interest the manuscript ‘Jungle’ gave me. In Chapter 1 – Sri Lanka: What went wrong – he traces in detail the historical evolution of the problem. He evaluates the myopic political visions of all our political leaders and, positioning their personal and political agendas ahead of the greater good of the nation. Through the earlier years of Colonial rule, the transition through the Donoughmore Constitution, Independence and the subsequent early years of self rule, the author with his acutely analytical mind shows how the horrendous head of the ethnic monster surfaced. In the immediate post-independence period, he assiduously demonstrates that politicians not only did nothing to quench the embers of ethnic strife, but indeed fanned them into the flames of conflagration.

In Chapter II – The Terrorist Movements – the author evaluates how the Sinhala political leadership naively, but literally fathered terrorism and how we have been inexorably drawn into open warfare. The prejudiced and jaundiced political evaluation of the ethnic problem, the stupid and dim-witted military strategies, the author shows had to inevitably lead to the holocaust that we witnessed in July 1983.

July 1983 was a paradigm shift in the politics of Sri Lanka, the civil war commenced. In Chapter III – The Civil War and in Chapter IV – The Indian Intervention – the author takes the reader through, the important events that took place towards the resolution of the conflict, the clumsy Indian intervention including the agreement that brought in the Indian Peace Keeping Force, and in the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi. Having brought on ourselves the horrors of terrorism and ethnic strife, the author in great and indeed interesting detail presents the minds and the actions of the leaders towards the resolution of this conflict.

Chapter V – The Protracted War – details the saga of a nation struggling to survive on the continued onslaughts of the most brutal terrorist movement in the world. Obviously the author had researched extensively the many details the battles that were lost, the strategies that failed – both materially and politically and the despondency of a nation in the grip of a civil war that could not clearly be won nor even sustained. The nation was clearly battle weary and reluctantly, certainly from a position of weakness – the nation was inexorably drawn into a quest for peace, as she was, due to very different reasons was drawn into a civil war earlier.

In Chapter VI – The Quest For Peace, is a superb but a very critical analysis of the new Prime Minister and his efforts towards peace subsequent to the General Election of December 2001. The Ceasefire Agreement, the active involvement of the Norwegians in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and the amazing details that the author presents in the various conferences that took place between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government is indeed remarkable and startling.

Throughout the book the reader will be able to grasp the author’s mind in the overall assessment of the politics of the nation vis-a-vis the ethnic strife and the civil war. The author’s assessment spells out of how the horrendous JRJ Constitution with its unprecedented powers posited into the Presidency, unheard of and unseen in the recent annals of political history, which he was critical even with JRJ himself when it was being formulated, divided the body politic of the nation which augmented the terrorism of the LTTE.

Critical analysis

The author’s critical analysis has been possible due to his undergraduate studies in Physics at the University of Ceylon and post graduate work in International Relations at Harvard. The book is a must for every intellectual who loves his motherland and intends to contribute towards the alleviation of travails that besets our beloved nation. He with his vast knowledge and authorship experience has certainly presented facts and carried out his analysis with an even hand, the hallmark of a good author, with malice to none. He has presented facts and analyzed them as they are.

However I would have enjoyed reading more, had he ventured into his own analysis on the various alternatives of the resolution of the conflict. Perhaps I am asking the impossible, considering the fact that for 25 long years our politicians have failed, and failed miserably at that. Perchance what JRJ said in early 1990 at a Rotary dinner I have quoted above was right. The LTTE has run out of war options. What JRJ did not foresee was that the Sri Lankan Government also has run out of such options. War weary and exhausted, both the Government and the LTTE are now, struggling and groping towards that peace which has eluded all, over 25 long years.

Perhaps, Jungle in his next book may be able to prescribe the miraculous peace formulae!!

Relax security in East — LTTE

The LTTE wants security forces and police to relax security measures in the Ampara-Batticaloa region. The request was made at Vavunativu divisional secretariat where the security forces and LTTE delegations met under the supervision of the Scandinavian truce monitors to discuss a range of issues relating to the implementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) in the region.

Ironically area leader Thambirajah Ramesh and his deputy Ram missed Tuesday’s meeting, authoritative security sources said. The LTTE delegation was led by Ramanan, the sources said. Their absence fuelled speculation that they had been sidelined by the group’s Kilinochchi leadership. The sources said the LTTE delegation did not respond to queries on the missing leaders and also the ongoing confrontations between them and Karuna loyalists in areas under LTTE control.

The government delegation led by Brigadier Vajira Wijegoonewardene, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) army’s 23 division included SSP Mahesh Samaradivakara, in charge of the Batticaloa police division and SP Upul Seneviratne of the STF.

The sources said the LTTE complained about what they described as heavy handed security checks at the Mankerni entry point. The government delegation pointed out that they implemented a special security programme in the region on repeated requests by the LTTE. Citing the presence of Karuna loyalists in the government-held areas, the group’s Kilinochchi leadership demanded stepped up security. The sources said these measures had also affected their own cadres mobility in the region, the sources said.

The government delegation has also raised the recent incident at Kadjuwatte where LTTE cadres fired in the air near an army sentry point, the abduction of a group of Muslims and the arrest of two armed LTTE cadres in the Valaichchnai area. (SF)

Prabhakaran demands for Palali Airport [2nd April 2002]

The leader of LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran has notified the Norway representatives that the Sri Lankan government must handover Palali Airport to the LTTE in order to facilitate Mr. Anton Balasingham, the LTTE theoretician who will represent LTTE in the peace talks.

The tiger leader has demanded that the Air force camp at Palali must be removed and the Airport should be given to the control of the LTTE since Mr. Balasingham will be traveling to Bangkok daily. LTTE leader has told the Norway representatives that Mr. Balasingham is ill and his daily tours must be facilitated as required and the SL government should handover the Airport before the peace talks. However the Lanka truth with Responsibility reveals that there are covert intentions in this proposed peace talks in Bangkok.

The first intention is to remove Palali Air Force Base. The next important intention is to find and easy mode of weapon transportation.LTTE has acknowledged peace talks be held in Bangkok, since their foremost weapon purchaser is in Thailand. This person A.K. Pathmanathan is one of the three persons who communicate with Prabhakaran via satellite communication.

Prabhaharan has collected a load of sophisticated weapons to be transported to northern Sri Lanka once the peace talks commence the weapon loads could be transported to Palali using the airplane which is used by Balasingham .

(www.go2lanka.com)

Child Conscription by LTTE – LTTE Teenager Speaks out

Rajendran Dayanandan aged 16 who was arrested in Kurukuttimurippukulam North of Puliyankulam is a young boy born in Muttur in theTrincomalee District to a family of seven. The statement made by him is as follows. “I am a boy who has never gone to school. About three months back when I went to buy bread, members of the LTTE approached me and forcefully took me into a camp. Although a 3-month training is given to the newly recruited cadres, I was only given one months training.

After I was forcibly taken to the organisation my father visited me and wanted to take me home. But when I informed the leader of the camp Karthikaran, he arrested me. The senior members of the camp never gave us sufficient food and clothing. They used to send us to the front and when we refuse we were assaulted. After the training I was sent on a recee mission with only one grenade where I was arrested by the Army.”

When spoke to him he further said, ” I had no intention of joining the organisation. But I was taken forcibly. There are lot of children like me who are being trained in the moment and they too are undergoing the same difficulties”. He also said that “I do not want to go back to the organisation but if I am given a chance, I will go home. I hope the Security Forces will put an end to this war and rescue all the children who are being forcefully trained and put to the front. We only want peace and harmony. We do not want the LTTE. I humbly request all the youth not to join or get caught to the LTTE. From the day I was arrested by the army they have treated me and looked after me very well”. It is observed child abuse in the LTTE organisation in continuing rapidly by recruiting children forcibly to put them in the war zone.

(http://reality.lanka.com)

Children in South Asia – Amnesty International Index 04/01/98 (extract from page 38)

Recruitment as Fighters Fifteen year old Raja went to the Teaching Hospital in Jaffna, Sri Lanka, complaining of insomnia, aggressive outbursts and irrational abnormal behaviour in late 1994. He had joined the LTTE at the age of 11 and underwent extensive training. He told doctors that after one attack where he lost many friends he was shown a videos of dead women and children and told that his enemies had done this. Soon afterwards he was involved in attacks on several Muslim villages near Batticaloa. When recounting one attack, he described how he held a child by the legs and bashed its head against a wall and how he enjoyed hearing the mother’s screaming. He said they deserved to die.

Tamil Tigers stopped for picnic before raid on Sri Lanka airport (Wednesday, July 25 3:37 PM SGT)

COLOMBO, July 25 (AFP) A busload of Tiger Tamil rebels enjoyed a picnic near a tightly-guarded international airport and adjoining military air base before launching a devastating attack which left 21people dead, police sources said Wednesday.

The revelation that the guerrillas could gather right under the nose of a military checkpoint has compounded the embarrassment for the defence establishment, airport sources said.

At least 14 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had what they knew was almost certainly their meal at a public park near the two facilities before breaking in and destroying military and civilian aircraft.

Press reports suggested local residents had alerted the authorities to the unusual gathering of the men near the airport, but they appeared to have not taken it seriously.

The suicide squad, including bombers with explosives strapped to their bodies, went on to sabotage the power supply in the area and then cut barbed wire fences to enter the supposedly high security area.

“We have found 13 pairs of boots and one pair of slippers worn by the Tigers,” a police official conducting the investigation said. “We believed they came barefoot, cut a perimeter fence and crept in. It was a one-way journey for those who went in.”

Police have issued an alert to track down the luxury 26-seat bus used by the suicide squad to get near the military and civilian aviation complex. As the devastated airport and the airbase were cleared Tuesday, the authorities were also dealing with the remains of the 14 men. Some blasted themselves to pieces as they set ablaze three civilian passenger jet liners.

Another suicide bomber’s body was found near a cargo belt at the terminal building. “Although we suspect only 14 entered the complex, and we have accounted for all of them, it is possible there were a few others who remained outside to co-ordinate the attack,” a police source said. It is believed the guerrillas may have planned the attack for several months and chose a time when half thefleet of Sri Lanka’s national carrier, SriLankan Airlines, was at the

airport.

Air force chief Air Chief Marshall Jayalath Weerakkody has appointed a court of inquiry headed by an air vice marshal to investigate lapses. President Chandrika Kumaratunga has

also ordered a top level probe. The attack was not even totally unexpected.The government itself had said the Tigers might try to strike to mark the 18th anniversary of anti-Tamil riots in Colombo in July 1983, in which up to 600 people were killed.

Security throughout the country is generally stepped up in July, which is regarded as the most violent period.

But the question remains how the rebels managed to attack the airport, supposedly protected by the tightest possible security.

Normally even wallets are searched at the entrance to Bandaranaike

airport.

It has its own crack team of commandos trained in anti-hijacking

operations, but they were not deployed to guard the aircraft and the terminal even two hours after the neighbouring airbase was hit, police said.

The first attacks against commercial airliners started long after the

guerrillas destroyed eight military aircraft. The rebels crossed the airport runway and then fired rocket propelled

grenades at aircraft.

The arms they brought into the complex caused even more embarrassment. The cache included three general purpose machine guns, one 40-mm grenade launcher, three rocket propelled

grenades, nine T-56 assault rifles, eight explosive charges and six

shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons.



(Yahoo! Asia – News – Asia)

Grenade, ammo found in Mannar school [TamilNet, October 07, 2004 09:01 GMT]

A hand grenade and eighteen rounds of live ammunition were found in a plastic container by the compound wall of a school in Mannar town Wednesday evening, Police said. The grenade was exploded by a bomb disposal squad from the Sri Lanka army camp in Thallady around seven p.m.

Construction workers in the Siththivinayagar Tamil School in Mannar town found the plastic container by the wall and informed the Police through the uppukkulam village officer.

Police said they are investigating how the grenade and ammo came to be near the school.