Striking terror, again

With successful strikes against its adversaries in Colombo, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam tries to place itself in a strong position and negotiate peace on its own terms.

Then, like a spider spinning its web, they wove a dense network of strands that would eventually subjugate them, removing any resisters at the first tremor.

– Francois Bizot (2004) in The Gate, a memoir of his experiences as a Khmer Rouge captive in the killing fields of Cambodia.

THROUGH three gruesome attacks in Colombo in July, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) not only reopened its urban front in its decades-long war against the Sri Lankan state, but gave a clear indication that its intelligence unit could dismember the best-laid plans of an adversary.

Finding itself at the wrong end of the gun in early July, the LTTE quickly settled scores with its adversaries – old and new – by the month-end. The July 7 suicide-bombing in which five people were killed at a police station in Colombo, the massacre of eight persons at a calm suburb of the capital and the murder of an anti-LTTE operative on July 31 explains the note of caution issued by the Norwegian peace facilitators that the “frozen war is starting to melt at the edges” and that political complacency does not augur well for the island.

After weeks of skirmishes in eastern Sri Lanka between the LTTE and the rebels led by its former military `commander’ V. Muralitharan alias `Col’ Karuna, the battleground shifted to Kottawa, about 15 kilometres from Colombo. In a pre-dawn attack, seven supporters of Karuna and a Sinhalese person were shot dead at point-blank range when they were asleep in a safe house, shattering the tranquillity of the Sinhalese-majority hamlet. “We heard something similar to crackers being set off around 3-30 a.m.,” neighbours told the police. Among the dead were Kuhanesan, reported to be the second-in-command and finance head of Karuna’s faction; Castro, who was in-charge of his military unit; and Kesavan, a graduate of the Eastern University, who had joined the Tigers recently.

About the Sinhalese person, Dhammika, the Tigers and the Sri Lanka Army have been making contradictory statements. While the Tigers claimed that he was an Army intelligence operative who was abetting Karuna, Army sources said he was a heavy-vehicle driver in north-central Polonnaruwa district, and suggested that he could have joined the LTTE “for money”. “The Directorate of Military Intelligence categorically denies [the] Army’s involvement and the Sri Lanka Army further assures that no military intelligence operative is among the dead,” the Army Headquarters said in a statement. According to Defence sources, Dhammika “had worked in LTTE-held areas two years ago and had continued to work with Karuna’s group after the March spilt [in the LTTE]”.

The police suspect the massacre to be “an inside job” as the victims offered no resistance and the door was not broken open. The plush ground floor was undisturbed. There was no visible damage to the house. The bullet-riddled bodies, some sprawled on mats with minimum nightwear, were strewn across. on the sparsely furnished first floor.

The blood-splattered walls, a radio playing Tamil film songs, a used magazine of an automatic pistol, spent .9 mm cartridges and mobile phones with their SIM cards missing were the only pieces of evidence. The Army says a .9 mm automatic Uzi pistol could have been used in the attack. A Sri Lankan Tamil had reportedly taken the house on lease for Rs.1.32 lakhs a year in early July under the pretext of conducting the weddings of his sons. The Sinhalese owner reportedly left for India after leasing out the house.

The LTTE did not claim responsibility for the massacre, but its official web site noted that the killings were carried out by the “dissidents” of Karuna’s group, who had “surrendered” to the Tigers in the eastern Amparai district after killing “seven Karuna’s men at 1 a.m.”. It alleged that the house was “provided with military security”, a charge that the Army denied. A press conference by the “dissidents” who had carried out the killing was scheduled by the LTTE in Kilinochchi, but was subsequently “postponed indefinitely”.

The immediate consequence of the Kottawa incident is the delay in Karuna’s publicly announced plan to start a new political party.

Another outcome is the change in the situation in eastern Sri Lanka, particularly Batticaloa district where Karuna was the undisputed LTTE leader for 17 years. In his July 11 interview to the BBC Tamil service, Karuna had said that the “eastern people would rise in revolt” if their “patience continued to be tested”. The Kottawa incident, however, changed the basis for all that. According to the sketchy information available from the east, the LTTE has once again gained the upper hand, with the muted public endorsement of Karuna’s rebellion on the wane. However, signs of continued resistance were evident from reports that the funeral of three slain supporters of Karuna was well-attended despite the LTTE diktat. BARELY a week after the gunning down of Karuna’s supporters, the long paw of the wounded Tiger reached out once again in Colombo to strike at one of its prime targets – the 41-year-old wrecker-in-chief of the LTTE’s plans, Kandiah Yogarasa, popularly known as `PLOTE’ Mohan. Yogarasa lay dead on a Colombo sidewalk in broad daylight, blood oozing from five gunshot wounds.

Mohan’s killing drew to an end a decade-long story of covert operations against the LTTE inside rebel-held territories in the east and the north.

Mohan parted ways with the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) in 1994. However, his accumulated resources and tricks of the trade fetched him a new ally – sections of the Sri Lanka military. Mohan had joined the PLOTE after the July 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. He received arms training in India. Under the nom de guerre `Tamilchelvan’, he was in charge of a training camp at Orathanadu in Tamil Nadu’s Tanjavur district. On his return, he was deployed in Vavuniya in the north and had left to Batticaloa district in the east after a fight with the LTTE.

Non-LTTE Tamil political groups described him as “the man the LTTE feared the most”. Mohan’s utility to the Sri Lanka Army intelligence rose when, in the late 1990s, the security forces conceived of a unit to strike inside the rebel territory. Later, when the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) were formed, Mohan’s role increased. According to sources, he is said to have been involved directly in attacks against the LTTE’s senior leadership in the run-up to the February 2002 ceasefire agreement. When the Sri Lanka Army’s Deep Penetration Units (DPUs) attached to the LRRPs were on the prowl in rebel-held Sri Lanka, Mohan is said to have helped them in selecting targets, choosing the location and planning the modus operandi of the attacks.

Among those killed during the DPU operations were `Col.’ Shankar, the head of LTTE’s fledgling rebel air wing and military intelligence, on September 26, 2001, (he was a relative and confidant of V. Prabakaran), Gangai Amaran (deputy leader of Sea Tigers) and Nizaam (Batticaloa-Amparai intelligence chief).

Mohan was reportedly lured to the normally busy R.A. De Mel Mawatha (Duplication Road) by someone he apparently trusted on a Poya (Full Moon) holiday (July 31) and shot dead with a .9 mm pistol.

Military analysts described the killing as “a prize hit” for the Tigers who were “gunning for him for several years”. A lone eyewitness to the killing was, however, unable to describe the killers and was not sure if the assailants had escaped on a motorcycle or a van, a senior police officer told reporters at the scene of the crime.

Eight spent .9 mm cartridges were found near Mohan’s body. There were no other casualties, primarily because the normally crowded road was nearly empty as it was a holiday.

A military analyst saw in the slaying of Mohan “a clear indication that the LTTE is not for a peaceful, negotiated settlement”. Expressing concern over the continued attacks on anti-LTTE operatives, defence analysts said the government was “using them and abandoning them to appease the LTTE” so that it would come back to talks.

Defence analysts see the murder as “a pre-emptive strike by the Tigers… as Mohan would have played a key role when fighting resumes”. The LTTE did not comment on the killing.

The murder of Mohan is somewhat similar to the May 1999 killing of another eastern paramilitary operative, P. Ganeshmoorthy (also known as Razeek), who headed a military unit of the splintered Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). A defence analyst said: “While Razeek carried out overt military strikes, Mohan was covert and had penetrated the Tigers. Both were effective.”

With Mohan out of the LTTE’s way and Karuna’s political plans in disarray, the Tigers are likely to call the shots in the coming months.

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Predators as prey

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam finds itself at the receiving end of a series of ambush operations directed at its senior leaders.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka is in the throes of a crisis. The past few months have seen a number of its senior and prominent leaders being targeted in landmine ambushes. Some have been fatal. The latest in the list is Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias “Colonel” Shankar, the head of the LTTE’s air wing and military intelligence division. The situation is ironical because the predators have now become the prey.

Past decades have seen Tiger operatives killing a number of persons regarded as enemies of the organisation in various parts of the island. The LTTE was able to choose the time, the place and the targets for operations of this type, and execute them meticulously. The Sri Lankan authorities were unable to prevent such attacks or bring to book their perpetrators. But now the tables have seemingly been turned on the Tigers. A pattern is emerging, where several senior LTTE activists are targeted in a systematic fashion in Tiger-controlled regions.

Shankar, killed on September 26 in a claymore device attack in the Oddusuddan area of Mullaithivu district in the northern mainland of the Wanni, was the highest-ranking and most senior Tiger leader to be killed in this manner (see box). Earlier, Gangai Amaran, deputy leader of the LTTE’s “Kadal Puli” (Sea Tiger) division, was killed along with his bodyguard in a similar explosion near Akkaraayan Kulam in Kilinochchi district.

In the eastern province, Nizaam, the head of the LTTE’s Batticaloa-Amparai political wing, was killed when the motorcycle he was travelling on was targeted for a claymore device blast at Vaathakalmadhu in Nallathanni Odai, about 36 km southwest of Batticaloa town. The LTTE’s eastern zone communications chief Mano was killed in an incident at Patharaimadam, about 6 km to the west of Valaiiravu in Batticaloa district. There were three attempts on the life of Ramanan, the LTTE’s intelligence wing leader for Batticaloa and Amparai districts – at Vellaveli, Palugaamam and Karadiyanaaru.

Other important leaders too have survived assassination attempts in the northern province. Balraj, deputy military commander of the LTTE, escaped miraculously when his vehicle was targeted at Nainamadhu in the Wanni. Likewise, Jeyam, a senior commander, escaped an attempt at Nedunkerni. The political wing chief, S.P. Thamilchelvan, was targeted twice. One attempt was made near Iranai Iluppaikulam, where his official vehicle hit a landmine. Thamilchelvan was not in the vehicle. His deputy, travelling in it, survived with injuries. The other attack was at Kokkavil in Kilinochchi when Thamilchelvan was on his way to meet a Norwegian peace delegation at Mallavi. A landmine exploded killing a bodyguard who travelled in a vehicle that followed the Tiger leader.

This campaign of ambushes has reportedly angered LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabakaran and has, understandably, caused consternation among LTTE cadre. A virtual state of emergency has been declared in the LTTE regions of the Wanni. “Colonel” Balraj, the LTTE’s deputy military commander and second in command to Prabakaran in military matters, has been appointed a special commander for the Wanni region and entrusted with a special task and powers by the LTTE supremo. According to informed sources, Balraj’s immediate goal is to halt the attacks on LTTE leaders and apprehend those responsible for them.

In its press releases, the LTTE has accused a “deep penetration commando unit of the Sri Lankan Army” of being responsible for Shankar’s killing and the other incidents. Pro-LTTE Tamil journals published abroad have stated that the attacks are perpetrated by small teams of special force commandos trained by a Western power. Such squads are said to infiltrate, through the jungle terrain of the Wanni, into LTTE-controlled zones and carry out the attacks. They are supposed to lie in wait with remote controls, trigger the devices at appropriate moments and leave the area immediately.

It is also suspected that some Tamils living in LTTE-controlled areas are collaborating with the Sri Lankan armed forces. They are suspected of providing intelligence, information, supplies and even safe houses for the assailants. These alleged collaborators are suspected to be undisclosed members or former members of the various non-LTTE Tamil militant groups, now living as civilians in the Wanni. Another theory is that the suspects are persons sympathetic to former LTTE deputy leader Mahathaya, who was executed for allegedly conspiring against Prabakaran. The possibility of ordinary people acting as mercenaries is also not ruled out. Tamil militants associated with the Army as “paramilitary personnel” may also be responsible for the attacks.

Interestingly, while the LTTE officially blames a “deep penetration team”, the Tigers in the eastern region have taken punitive action against Tamil civilians. In the eastern region, the LTTE controls the hinterland to the west of the Batticaloa lagoon, known as Paduvaan- karai (the shore of the setting sun) while the government controls the littoral regions to the east of the lagoon, known as Eluvaankarai (the shore of the rising sun). Initially, there were five crossing points across the lagoon for people commuting between the regions. Recently, the Tigers closed down three of them, in order to facilitate a greater and more intensive scrutiny of “infiltrators” and check whether explosive devices are smuggled in.

In the eastern region, the LTTE also undertook a massive search-and-arrest operation. Several persons were detained and interrogated. The LTTE claimed that 37 explosive devices, concealed in vantage points and stored in safehouses, were discovered following the investigation. At least five Tamil civilians were executed for their alleged involvement in the assassination campaign. Two of the executions were gruesome. The victims, who were first forced to make a public confession, were compelled to kill themselves using the explosives they were accused of possessing. It was alleged that these persons had betrayed the Tamil cause for financial remuneration offered by the government.

However, the LTTE’s approach in the northern region seems to be different. It suspects that the deep-penetration teams originate from the Manal Aaru or Weli Oya military complex, situated in a strategic location interdicting the territorial contiguity of the Tamil-dominated northern and Tamil-majority eastern provinces. In an attempt to prevent or at least contain suspected infiltration, the Tigers are now establishing a tight security cordon around the forward defence lines of the Weli Oya complex.

The LTTE has also intensified “border” security along the southern line of control, between Vidathaltheevu in the western Mannar district and Kumulamunai in the eastern Mullaithivu district. The civilian militia, known as “ellaippadai” or border force, is involved, along with regular cadre, in such operations. However, the demarcation line is almost 190 km long and consists of several jungle tracts that are quite porous. If the LTTE is to seal off this border effectively, it has to redeploy a substantial number of fighters from its strategically important northern front along the Kilaly-Eluthumadduvaal-Nagar Kovil axis. There is a severe logistical dilemma here.

According to a Tamil resident of the Wanni with whom this writer spoke over telephone, the LTTE has started a systematic “search, detain and interrogate” campaign. Regular fighters and members of the LTTE’s police force and intelligence wings are engaged in this. The LTTE’s “Leopards” commando unit and civilian militia cadre are combing the jungles to flush out any deep-penetration squads trekking there.

A SIGNIFICANT feature of the ambushes is that the targets in all cases are senior and important leaders of the LTTE. In view of this fact, the leaders have been asked to take certain precautions. For instance, senior LTTE figures, who travel in jeeps or are accompanied by back-up vehicles with bodyguards or travel in convoys, have been asked to avoid such practices. The Tigers have usually used minor, interior roads more often than major open roads used by civilians. Almost all the assassinations and assassination attempts occurred on these roads. Now the LTTE has begun to use the main roads.

Meanwhile, the government has denied that the security forces are responsible for the assassination campaign. The government says that the attacks are the result of a bitter power struggle within the organisation. Government propaganda has been based on this line of argument in the past few months, in a bid to convince the nation and the world that internal squabbles, and not governmental action, are responsible for this state of affairs.

If this claim were true, the LTTE would certainly not have publicised the killings or the assassination attempts. It would have been practical to keep the matter under wraps, as was done in the case of the Mahathaya episode. If the LTTE wanted it to be so, there was little chance of the incidents coming to light. Instead, the Tigers continue to publicise such incidents, resulting, in the process, in an erosion in the myth of invincibility surrounding it. Moreover, the scale and scope of the attacks point to factors that cannot be explained away by theories of internecine strife.

Another pointer to the possibility of state agencies being involved in this campaign is the presence of an occasional snippet in the Colombo media about strikes made by “long-range assault groups”. However, the references are vague and no details are given. Earlier, the media carried columns by military experts explaining the need to launch effective assault operations like the current ones to penetrate LTTE areas and selectively target Tiger leaders. The example cited was the American and British special force operations of a similiar nature in confrontations elsewhere. The experts felt that this was better than conducting frontal operations which resulted in heavy losses. Now there is an apparent “silence” about these ideas in the media, probably because practical action is being taken. It is also noteworthy that the security forces have intensified security in the southern areas in the aftermath of Shankar’s killing, fearing reprisals.

If the Sri Lankan forces are indeed responsible for this ambush campaign but not publicising it, then that situation too is fraught with irony. The Sri Lankan armed forces have faced a lot of negative publicity for various “failures” in its operations against the LTTE. Now they are supposedly engaged in an effective campaign that is affecting the LTTE. The Tigers’ territorial impregnability is being assailed, their chief leaders are being targeted, and the cadres are being demoralised. Although the LTTE blames the armed forces publicly, those responsible for the campaign are unable to take credit for it. This is because of both the confidential nature of the exercise and the reluctance in official circles to admit that an assassination campaign is being conducted.

Whosoever is conducting them, the LTTE is under severe threat from the operations. The LTTE’s inability to prevent or even reduce the extent of the threat, and also the fact that none of the alleged perpetrators has been caught, are damaging. If the campaign continues and the Tigers are unable to check it, their efficiency will be doubted. Also, the theory of the attacks being an “internal affair” of the LTTE will gather credence. Another problem for the LTTE is the need to deplete other fronts to deploy additional personnel necessary to seal its borders completely. Intensive searches, detentions and interrogation of members of the public in a bid to weed out suspected collaborators are likely to alienate the population living in areas under its control.

Recent responses by the LTTE leadership to the operations indicate that the LTTE, while going all out to eradicate the danger, will also avenge the killings. Shankar in particular was a close friend and long-time comrade-in-arms of Prabakaran. His death is unlikely to be left unavenged. An LTTE statement said: “The LTTE leadership shares the Tamil people’s outrage and treats the killing of a senior leader with utmost gravity.” It remains to be seen what type of action the LTTE will take in this regard.

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